When there are more cards to come, your bluffs should rarely be pure bluffs - that is to say, bets or raises that have little or no chance of winning if you are called, even taking into account the cards you may get on future rounds. Instead your early-round bets should be semi-bluffs, those powerful, deceptive plays we looked at in detail in Chapters Eleven and Twelve. It is important to bluff occasionally on early rounds to keep your opponents off-balance. But why do it when you have only one or two ways of winning? For a pure bluff to work, your opponent or opponents must generally fold immediately. However, as we saw in Chapter Eleven, a semi-bluff has three ways of winning. It may win because your opponent folds immediately, and it may also win either because you catch a scare card that causes your opponent to fold on a later round or because you make the best hand.
Nevertheless, while you should usually restrict your early-round bluffs to semi-bluffs, there is still nothing to prevent you from trying a pure bluff if you feel there's a good chance of getting away with it. If you think your chances of getting away with it are greater than the pot odds you are getting, then you should go ahead and try it. You may recall in the chapter on ante structure we mentioned playing in a game where certain players played too tight for the ante. There was $10 in antes, and if these players were the only ones in the pot, I knew I could bet $7 with absolutely nothing and have a good chance of stealing that $10. My pot odds in that instance were less than 11/2-to-1, but I knew I could get away with the bluff about 60 percent of the time. So it was a profitable play.
Saturday, May 17, 2008
Optimum Bluffing Frequency
What is the right bluffing frequency? It is a frequency that makes it impossible for your opponents to know whether to call or fold. Mathematically, optimal bluffing strategy is to bluff in such a way that the chances against your bluffing are identical to the pot odds your opponent is getting. Thus, if, as in the example just given, an opponent is getting 6-to-l from the pot, the chances against your bluffing should be 6-to-1. Then that opponent would break even on the last bet by calling every time and also by folding every time. If he called, he would lose $20 six times and win S120 once; if he folded, he would win nothing and lose nothing. Regardless of what your opponent does, you average winning an extra $100 every seven hands. However, mathematically optimal bluffing strategy isn't necessarily the best strategy. It is much better if you are able to judge when to try a bluff and when not to in order to show a bigger overall profit.
To make sure we agree on what is meant by a bluff, we wilt define it as a bet or a raise with a hand which you do not think is the best hand. Bluffing can be separated into a couple of different categories. There is bluffing when there are more cards to come and when there are no more cards to come. Secondly, within each of these categories, there is intuitive bluffing, which is the subject of this chapter, and mathematical bluffing, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
To make sure we agree on what is meant by a bluff, we wilt define it as a bet or a raise with a hand which you do not think is the best hand. Bluffing can be separated into a couple of different categories. There is bluffing when there are more cards to come and when there are no more cards to come. Secondly, within each of these categories, there is intuitive bluffing, which is the subject of this chapter, and mathematical bluffing, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
The Reality of Bluffing
With this proviso, it must be repeated that from a theoretical point of view, bluffing is an extremely important aspect of poker. As a deceptive weapon, it is at least as important as slowplaying. Whereas slowplaying suggests weakness when you have strength, bluffing announces strength when you are weak. Recollect the Fundamental Theorem of Poker: Any time an opponent plays his hand incorrectly based on what you have, you have gained; and any time he plays his hand correctly based on what you have, you have lost. An opponent who knows you never bluff is much less likely to play his hand incorrectly. Any time you bet, he will know you are betting for value. He will play only when he figures he has a better hand than yours or when he is getting sufficient pot odds to call with more cards to come. Bluffing, then, or the possibility that you might be bluffing, is another way of keeping your opponents guessing. Your occasional bluffs disguise not just the hands with which you are in fact bluffing but also your legitimate hands, with which your opponents know you might be bluffing.
To see how important bluffing is, imagine that you are up against an opponent who on the last round bets $20 into a $100 pot. You are getting 6-to-1 from the pot if you call. However, you know you can only win, as is often the case, if your opponent is bluffing. Let's say you know three opponents well. The first never bluffs in this spot, so your response to that player's bet is easy: You fold with the full knowledge that you have not cost yourself any money. The second opponent frequently bluffs. Once again your response is easy: You call, knowing you are going to win that last bet so often that calling must result in a long-run profit. The third player is the problem. He bets in such a way that the odds are about 6-to-l against his bluffing. In fact, he can tell you in advance that if he bets, he will be bluffing once in seven times.
Now you have a tough decision. You must choose between two equally upsetting alternatives. You are getting 6-to-l from a pot you can win only if your opponent is bluffing, and the odds against your opponent's bluffing are 6-to-1. If you fold, you know there's a chance your opponent stole the pot from you; but if you call, you know that six times out of seven you are simply donating your money to your opponent. Thus, a person who bluffs with approximately the right frequency - and also, of course, in a random way - is a much better poker player and will win much more money in the long run than a person who virtually never bluffs or a person who bluffs too much. The person who never bluffs will never get much action. The person who always bluffs will get all the action he wants until he runs out of money. But the person who bluffs correctly keeps his true holdings disguised and is constantly forcing his opponents into tough decisions, some of which are bound to be wrong.
To see how important bluffing is, imagine that you are up against an opponent who on the last round bets $20 into a $100 pot. You are getting 6-to-1 from the pot if you call. However, you know you can only win, as is often the case, if your opponent is bluffing. Let's say you know three opponents well. The first never bluffs in this spot, so your response to that player's bet is easy: You fold with the full knowledge that you have not cost yourself any money. The second opponent frequently bluffs. Once again your response is easy: You call, knowing you are going to win that last bet so often that calling must result in a long-run profit. The third player is the problem. He bets in such a way that the odds are about 6-to-l against his bluffing. In fact, he can tell you in advance that if he bets, he will be bluffing once in seven times.
Now you have a tough decision. You must choose between two equally upsetting alternatives. You are getting 6-to-l from a pot you can win only if your opponent is bluffing, and the odds against your opponent's bluffing are 6-to-1. If you fold, you know there's a chance your opponent stole the pot from you; but if you call, you know that six times out of seven you are simply donating your money to your opponent. Thus, a person who bluffs with approximately the right frequency - and also, of course, in a random way - is a much better poker player and will win much more money in the long run than a person who virtually never bluffs or a person who bluffs too much. The person who never bluffs will never get much action. The person who always bluffs will get all the action he wants until he runs out of money. But the person who bluffs correctly keeps his true holdings disguised and is constantly forcing his opponents into tough decisions, some of which are bound to be wrong.
The Myth of Bluffing
Successful bluffs, particularly in a high-stakes game, have great drama. Furthermore, people who do not play much poker often think that bluffing is the central element of the game. When Stu Ungar appeared on the Mery Griffin Show the day after he won the 1980 world poker championship, the first question Griffin asked him was, "Did you bluff very much?" Many occasional players who visit Las Vegas are constantly bluffing in the small $l-$3 and $l-$4 games, and they pay dearly for their foolishness.
It's true bluffing is an important aspect of poker, but it is only one part of the game, certainly no more important than playing your legitimate hands correctly. Though a player who never bluffs cannot expect to win as much money as someone who bluffs with the proper frequency, most average players tend to bluff too much, particularly in limit games. When it costs an opponent only one more bet to see your hand, it is difficult to get away with a bluff, for with any kind of hand your opponent is usually getting sufficient pot odds to call your bet - especially if he has seen you trying to bluff several times already.
It's true bluffing is an important aspect of poker, but it is only one part of the game, certainly no more important than playing your legitimate hands correctly. Though a player who never bluffs cannot expect to win as much money as someone who bluffs with the proper frequency, most average players tend to bluff too much, particularly in limit games. When it costs an opponent only one more bet to see your hand, it is difficult to get away with a bluff, for with any kind of hand your opponent is usually getting sufficient pot odds to call your bet - especially if he has seen you trying to bluff several times already.
Position Vis-A-Vis Other Players in the Game
Position is important in relation to the playing style of the other players in the game. You prefer having the loose, aggressive player in the game sitting to your right and the tight, conservative player to your left. Then you can usually decide how to play your hand after the aggressive player has acted, while you don't have to worry about many surprises from the conservative player behind you. You are also in a better position to control the aggressive player and indeed to trap him into mistakes. Similarly, if there are players in the game who tip off whether or not they are playing a hand, you'd like them to your left so you can use that information when deciding whether to call the first bet yourself.
Summary
In sum, while in a horse race you like being first, in a poker game you like being last.
Chapter Eighteen
Bluffing
The 1978 no-limit hold 'em world championship at the Horseshoe in Las Vegas came down to a battle between owlish Bobby Baldwin of Tulsa, Oklahoma, and sartorial real-estate magnate Crandall Addington of San Antonio, Texas. An hour before the championship ended. Addington had $275,000, and Baldwin, about half as much - $145,000. Among the gamblers along the rail Addington was the clear favorite, but then came the hand that turned everything around. Acting first, Baldwin bet before the flop, and Addington called. The flop came:
Baldwin pushed in another $30,000 worth of chips, perhaps chasing a straight or a diamond flush. Then again he might have had a pair of queens. But Addington promptly called the $30,000. Obviously he had a good hand himself.
On fourth street the ace of diamonds fell - a scary-looking card - and by that time there was $92,000 in the pot. Slowly and deliberately Baldwin pushed in one $10,000 stack of chips, then another and another, until there were nine stacks in the center of the table. Finally, with something of a flourish, Baldwin placed a short stack of $5,000 on top of the others. He was making a $95,000 bet, leaving himself almost broke,
Addington deliberated for a long time. He glanced at the stack of chips, and then at Baldwin for some clue. Was the kid bluffing? If Addington called the bet and won, Baldwin would be just about tapped out. If he called the bet and lost, Baldwin would take a commanding lead. Was the kid bluffing or not? Addington decided he wasn't and threw away his hand. As Baldwin raked in the $92,000 pot, he made sure to flash his two hole cards in Addington's direction. They were the:
Worthless. Baldwin had indeed been bluffing. Addington seemed to get rattled, and an hour later Baldwin won all the chips and became the 1978 poker champion of the world.
Summary
In sum, while in a horse race you like being first, in a poker game you like being last.
Chapter Eighteen
Bluffing
The 1978 no-limit hold 'em world championship at the Horseshoe in Las Vegas came down to a battle between owlish Bobby Baldwin of Tulsa, Oklahoma, and sartorial real-estate magnate Crandall Addington of San Antonio, Texas. An hour before the championship ended. Addington had $275,000, and Baldwin, about half as much - $145,000. Among the gamblers along the rail Addington was the clear favorite, but then came the hand that turned everything around. Acting first, Baldwin bet before the flop, and Addington called. The flop came:
Baldwin pushed in another $30,000 worth of chips, perhaps chasing a straight or a diamond flush. Then again he might have had a pair of queens. But Addington promptly called the $30,000. Obviously he had a good hand himself.
On fourth street the ace of diamonds fell - a scary-looking card - and by that time there was $92,000 in the pot. Slowly and deliberately Baldwin pushed in one $10,000 stack of chips, then another and another, until there were nine stacks in the center of the table. Finally, with something of a flourish, Baldwin placed a short stack of $5,000 on top of the others. He was making a $95,000 bet, leaving himself almost broke,
Addington deliberated for a long time. He glanced at the stack of chips, and then at Baldwin for some clue. Was the kid bluffing? If Addington called the bet and won, Baldwin would be just about tapped out. If he called the bet and lost, Baldwin would take a commanding lead. Was the kid bluffing or not? Addington decided he wasn't and threw away his hand. As Baldwin raked in the $92,000 pot, he made sure to flash his two hole cards in Addington's direction. They were the:
Worthless. Baldwin had indeed been bluffing. Addington seemed to get rattled, and an hour later Baldwin won all the chips and became the 1978 poker champion of the world.
How Position Affects Play
To show how differently you have to play in first and last positions, let's say I'm dealt
in no-limit hold 'em (where position remains fixed throughout the hand). If the opponent on my left raised a moderate amount and got three calls, I would also call as long as most of the players had a decent amount of money in front of them. Were I to flop three 6s (the odds against it are about 8-to-1), I'd anticipate winning a big pot. However, were the player on my right to raise the same amount, I'd have to fold my pair of 6s even if I thought there would be some calls but no raises behind me.
My bad position is what makes the difference. It changes things enough on future rounds to turn a call into a fold. If I were to flop three 6s in last position, that 6 on board would look pretty innocuous. The original bettor would probably bet again, maybe get called, and then I could put in a big raise - or perhaps slowplay and wait to raise on fourth street. However, if the bettor were to my right, I couldn't immediately raise with three 6s and hope to be called by players behind me whether on the flop or on fourth street. Thus, when I'm directly behind the bettor, my implied odds are reduced so much that it's not worth calling that bettor's first raise before the flop.
in no-limit hold 'em (where position remains fixed throughout the hand). If the opponent on my left raised a moderate amount and got three calls, I would also call as long as most of the players had a decent amount of money in front of them. Were I to flop three 6s (the odds against it are about 8-to-1), I'd anticipate winning a big pot. However, were the player on my right to raise the same amount, I'd have to fold my pair of 6s even if I thought there would be some calls but no raises behind me.
My bad position is what makes the difference. It changes things enough on future rounds to turn a call into a fold. If I were to flop three 6s in last position, that 6 on board would look pretty innocuous. The original bettor would probably bet again, maybe get called, and then I could put in a big raise - or perhaps slowplay and wait to raise on fourth street. However, if the bettor were to my right, I couldn't immediately raise with three 6s and hope to be called by players behind me whether on the flop or on fourth street. Thus, when I'm directly behind the bettor, my implied odds are reduced so much that it's not worth calling that bettor's first raise before the flop.
Strong Hand, Bettor to the Right
If you had the same strong hand but the bettor were to your right, you would not be able to play the hand in the same way. If you raised, you would be requiring players behind you to call a double bet to continue. Thus, you'd get fewer callers (if any) than you would if you raised in last position after they had committed themselves by calling the first bet. On the other hand, by just calling in first position, the best you can hope for is to collect some single bets from players behind you. At the same time, when there are more cards to come, you're making it relatively cheap for the callers to draw out on you. So with more cards to come, you have to decide whether your hand can stand competition or whether you should raise to drive players out.
Strong Hand, Bettor to the Left
Another significant advantage to last position is that when you make a strong hand, you have more opportunity to win a big pot. You can sit there innocently with your monster hand and let the bettor to your left drive the other players around to you. That opponent bets, two or three players ahead of you call, and now bang, you raise. You get at least a single bet from opponents who fold after you raise, and you get a double bet from those who call. You're also making it more expensive for them to try to draw out on you when there are more cards to come. (Notice, in this situation, the problems faced by players in first and middle positions. Those callers in the middle always risk a raise from a player behind them.)
Adjusting Play to Position
There are times when your positional advantage allows you to win a pot you would not otherwise have won. Most of the time, though, the best hand wins, whether it happens to be first or last. So what we really mean by positional advantage is the extra bets that may be saved or gained by your being in late position - a check after your opponent checks, a raise after your opponent bets, and so on. The importance of these extra bets cannot be overemphasized. Never forget that in poker we are trying to win money, not pots. Every decent player wins a fair share of pots, but it is the extra bets you can get into the pots you win and those you can save from the pots you lose that increase your hourly rate and the money won in the long run.
There is little you can do to secure last position from one deal to the next, but when you have it, you should make the most of it. In seven-card stud, for example, you should anticipate the position you will be in from one round to the next. If an ace or an open pair is to your immediate left, that figures to make you last in the next round. You may play your hand a little differently, a little more aggressively, a little more loosely, than you would if you were expecting to be first.
In contrast, when the bettor is to your immediate right, forcing you to act ahead of everyone else, you must tighten up considerably. It is extremely important that you fold almost all marginal hands in this position. The possibility of a raise behind you plus the chance of a reraise from the original bettor is devastating. Furthermore, you can frequently count on being in the same unpleasant position - not accidentally called under the gun - for the remainder of the hand. If you constantly call bets with marginal hands in this position, you will have to fold so many of them - either later in the same round when the bet is raised or on the next round when the bet is repeated - that you will lose an enormous amount relative to the occasional pots you might win by staying in.
Thus, in five-card draw, if a player to your immediate right in early position opens, you should throw away two aces in most cases. In the same position in lowball, you'd usually have to throw away a one-card draw to a 7, 6 and possibly a 7, 5, even though these are hands you'd gladly play if you were sure there would be no raises behind you. In seven-card stud if the player to your right raises the opener on third street, you should fold most middle-sized pairs when there are several people behind you who might reraise.
With any of these hands you'd almost certainly call in last position, a fact that underlines another of that position's advantages: You can play more hands. You no longer need to fear a raise from players who have not acted, and in most instances you will probably remain last on future betting rounds as well. Even in seven-card stud, when the bettor to your left happens not to be high on board and thus first to act, the other players will usually check around to that bettor on the following round.
There is little you can do to secure last position from one deal to the next, but when you have it, you should make the most of it. In seven-card stud, for example, you should anticipate the position you will be in from one round to the next. If an ace or an open pair is to your immediate left, that figures to make you last in the next round. You may play your hand a little differently, a little more aggressively, a little more loosely, than you would if you were expecting to be first.
In contrast, when the bettor is to your immediate right, forcing you to act ahead of everyone else, you must tighten up considerably. It is extremely important that you fold almost all marginal hands in this position. The possibility of a raise behind you plus the chance of a reraise from the original bettor is devastating. Furthermore, you can frequently count on being in the same unpleasant position - not accidentally called under the gun - for the remainder of the hand. If you constantly call bets with marginal hands in this position, you will have to fold so many of them - either later in the same round when the bet is raised or on the next round when the bet is repeated - that you will lose an enormous amount relative to the occasional pots you might win by staying in.
Thus, in five-card draw, if a player to your immediate right in early position opens, you should throw away two aces in most cases. In the same position in lowball, you'd usually have to throw away a one-card draw to a 7, 6 and possibly a 7, 5, even though these are hands you'd gladly play if you were sure there would be no raises behind you. In seven-card stud if the player to your right raises the opener on third street, you should fold most middle-sized pairs when there are several people behind you who might reraise.
With any of these hands you'd almost certainly call in last position, a fact that underlines another of that position's advantages: You can play more hands. You no longer need to fear a raise from players who have not acted, and in most instances you will probably remain last on future betting rounds as well. Even in seven-card stud, when the bettor to your left happens not to be high on board and thus first to act, the other players will usually check around to that bettor on the following round.
Advantages of First Position
However, this point does bring out the fact that there are a few situations where it's advantageous to be first. In first or early position you get more check-raising opportunities. Furthermore, with a lock in first position you might win three bets by betting and reraising. Finally, you sometimes want to drive players out to make your hand stand up; only raising in early position, before opponents have had the opportunity to call the first bet, can succeed in doing this. Nevertheless, these first and early position advantages are minimal in comparison to the many advantages of being last.
Advantages of Last Position
To suggest how important it is to be last, let's take a situation from seven-card razz. Suppose you started off with a good three-card low, and you think your opponent did, too. Now you catch a king or even a queen, and your opponent pairs up on board. Without a pair, you clearly have the best low hand if play were to stop immediately, yet you should not bet. The open pair makes it likely that your opponent will be last to act on every betting round, and that fact more than makes up for your slightly better first four cards.
Why is it so much better to be last? For a variety of reasons. If you are in last position with only a fair-to-good hand and the first player bets, you can call without having to fear a raise behind you. Players in early or middle position have no such comfort. If they call with a fair hand, they risk having to throw it away or pay a big price to continue when there's a raise behind them.
If you have a big hand in last position, your advantage is even greater. To see how much so, compare it to being first. In first position with a big hand, you might try to check-raise. But if no one bets behind you, you have lost a few bets from players who would have called a bet from you, while you have given a free card to players who wouldn't have called.
On the other hand, if you come right out betting in first position, you cost yourself money when a check-raise would have worked. Even in middle position with a big hand, you have difficult tactical decisions. If no one has yet bet and it's up to you, you must decide whether to bet or risk sandbagging. If someone has bet in front of you, you must decide whether it is more profitable and tactically correct to raise, inevitably driving out some players behind you, or to call in the hope of some overcalls behind you. In last position, you have no such problems. If no one has bet, you can, and if someone has bet ahead of you, you are at liberty to raise or to slowplay after knowing how many players are likely to remain in the pot.
If your hand is mediocre, it is still advantageous to be last. On the first round you can call the small opening bet without fear of a raise. On later rounds players ahead of you may check better hands than yours, which allows you to check behind them and get a free card. However, if you checked that same mediocre hand in an early position, an opponent might bet a fair hand behind you, denying you a free card and probably forcing you to fold.
When the pot is down to two players, positional considerations still apply, perhaps more than when there are several players in the pot. In last position you can bet a big hand when your opponent doesn't and raise when he does. With the same hand in first position, you'd have to decide whether to try a check-raise or bet; when you check with the intention of raising and your opponent checks behind you, you cost yourself a bet; if you bet when a check-raise would have worked, you also cost yourself a bet.
With a mediocre hand against one player, it's also advantageous to be last. If you can't call a bet, you still may get a free card when your opponent checks. In first position, as we saw in Chapter Ten, you are not at liberty to give yourself a free card. Finally, if your hand is somewhere in the middle - good but not great - it is better to be last. It's true you will bet in either position, but in last position you have the edge of being able to call when your opponent bets. In first position you might bet what is a calling hand and find yourself raised by your opponent in last position.
The only real threat to a player in last position is the possibility of a check-raise. Consequently, in games where check-raising is not allowed, being last is even more advantageous. Once players ahead of you have checked, you can feel reasonably confident they are not sandbagging with a big hand.
Why is it so much better to be last? For a variety of reasons. If you are in last position with only a fair-to-good hand and the first player bets, you can call without having to fear a raise behind you. Players in early or middle position have no such comfort. If they call with a fair hand, they risk having to throw it away or pay a big price to continue when there's a raise behind them.
If you have a big hand in last position, your advantage is even greater. To see how much so, compare it to being first. In first position with a big hand, you might try to check-raise. But if no one bets behind you, you have lost a few bets from players who would have called a bet from you, while you have given a free card to players who wouldn't have called.
On the other hand, if you come right out betting in first position, you cost yourself money when a check-raise would have worked. Even in middle position with a big hand, you have difficult tactical decisions. If no one has yet bet and it's up to you, you must decide whether to bet or risk sandbagging. If someone has bet in front of you, you must decide whether it is more profitable and tactically correct to raise, inevitably driving out some players behind you, or to call in the hope of some overcalls behind you. In last position, you have no such problems. If no one has bet, you can, and if someone has bet ahead of you, you are at liberty to raise or to slowplay after knowing how many players are likely to remain in the pot.
If your hand is mediocre, it is still advantageous to be last. On the first round you can call the small opening bet without fear of a raise. On later rounds players ahead of you may check better hands than yours, which allows you to check behind them and get a free card. However, if you checked that same mediocre hand in an early position, an opponent might bet a fair hand behind you, denying you a free card and probably forcing you to fold.
When the pot is down to two players, positional considerations still apply, perhaps more than when there are several players in the pot. In last position you can bet a big hand when your opponent doesn't and raise when he does. With the same hand in first position, you'd have to decide whether to try a check-raise or bet; when you check with the intention of raising and your opponent checks behind you, you cost yourself a bet; if you bet when a check-raise would have worked, you also cost yourself a bet.
With a mediocre hand against one player, it's also advantageous to be last. If you can't call a bet, you still may get a free card when your opponent checks. In first position, as we saw in Chapter Ten, you are not at liberty to give yourself a free card. Finally, if your hand is somewhere in the middle - good but not great - it is better to be last. It's true you will bet in either position, but in last position you have the edge of being able to call when your opponent bets. In first position you might bet what is a calling hand and find yourself raised by your opponent in last position.
The only real threat to a player in last position is the possibility of a check-raise. Consequently, in games where check-raising is not allowed, being last is even more advantageous. Once players ahead of you have checked, you can feel reasonably confident they are not sandbagging with a big hand.
Position
A player's position in the betting sequence is an important, yet underrated aspect of poker. In our discussion of raising, check-raising, and the free card, we have shown how position affects the way you play a hand. Indeed it can be said that position is one of the key elements affecting virtually every play in poker.
In games like five-card draw, draw lowball, and hold 'em, you know your position in advance of each deal since the person to the left of the dealer, the man under the gun as he's described, always acts first, and the dealer acts last. However, in stud games, both high and low, you can rarely be sure where you'll be in the betting sequence from one round to the next, as we have noted.
Position is more important in some games than in others; it is particularly critical in hold 'em and in five-card draw and draw lowball. However, in all poker games it is far better to be last to act, primarily because it is generally easier to decide what to do after you have seen what your opponents have done. Logically, then, the worst position is to be first since you must act before you know what any of your opponents are going to do. You might, for instance, have a hand that's worth a call if there are two or three other callers, but in first or early position you cannot be sure there will be any other callers. In last position you could know for sure whether you were getting favorable pot odds for a call, and if you weren't, you could save a bet and fold. When you are neither first nor last, the closer you are to last position the better, since you have fewer unknown quantities behind you and more relatively known quantities in front of you.
In games like five-card draw, draw lowball, and hold 'em, you know your position in advance of each deal since the person to the left of the dealer, the man under the gun as he's described, always acts first, and the dealer acts last. However, in stud games, both high and low, you can rarely be sure where you'll be in the betting sequence from one round to the next, as we have noted.
Position is more important in some games than in others; it is particularly critical in hold 'em and in five-card draw and draw lowball. However, in all poker games it is far better to be last to act, primarily because it is generally easier to decide what to do after you have seen what your opponents have done. Logically, then, the worst position is to be first since you must act before you know what any of your opponents are going to do. You might, for instance, have a hand that's worth a call if there are two or three other callers, but in first or early position you cannot be sure there will be any other callers. In last position you could know for sure whether you were getting favorable pot odds for a call, and if you weren't, you could save a bet and fold. When you are neither first nor last, the closer you are to last position the better, since you have fewer unknown quantities behind you and more relatively known quantities in front of you.
Tight Games
In a tight game semi-bluffs increase in value, and even pure bluffs can be profitable since tight players are more likely to fold. Paradoxically, though, legitimate hands don't have nearly the value in a tight game that they would have in an average or loose game. The reason should be obvious. When you bet a legitimate hand for value in a tight game, you will be called only by players who have strong hands themselves because tight players' starting requirements are higher. In a loose game an opponent with two small pair at the end will probably call your bet with aces up. But when you bet that same hand in a tight game - especially if both of your aces are showing - and you get called, you cannot feel too comfortable. The caller probably has you beat.
Many aggressive players fail to devaluate their legitimate hands when they sit down in a tight game. They steal money with bluffs and semi-bluffs, but when they get a decent hand, they wind up losing. Then they mumble to themselves, "If I just never got a hand, I'd be doing great because it's with my good hands that I lose." What they fail to realize is that in a tight game the value of a hand goes down because players who stay in the pot will have good hands themselves - better hands on average than players in a regular game would have.
In a tight game, then, you loosen up on bluffs and semi-bluffs, but you tighten up on your legitimate hands. Nor would you play as many drawing hands in a tight game, since you'd be getting pot odds sufficient to make it worthwhile less often, and when you did hit, you wouldn't get paid off as much as you would in an average or in a loose game.
Summary
Scrap the general notion that you play tight in a loose game and loose in a tight game and use the following guidelines instead. In a loose game you must tighten up on your bluffs and semi-bluffs, but loosen up on your legitimate hands. You bluff less, but you bet for value more. You also call with more hands and play more drawing hands. In a tight game you loosen up on your bluffs and semi-bluffs, but you must tighten up your legitimate hand requirements.
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The mathematical principle here is the same as the principle that governs bluffing against more than one opponent. See Chapter Eighteen.
You bluff more, but you bet for value less. You also call less and give up more quickly with drawing hands.
These guidelines can also be applied to individual players, as well as to games. When a very tight player with
raises in a small-ante seven stud game and everyone ahead of you folds, you would probably throw away a pair of jacks. You've tightened up your requirements because the chances are good your opponent already has you beat with a pair of kings. But when a very loose player raises in the same spot and everyone ahead of you folds, you might reraise with jacks, not as a semi-bluff but as a bet for value.
On the other hand, if you had
you might semi-bluff raise the very tight player who's betting a pair of kings since there's a decent chance that player will throw away the best hand, fearing you have aces. You wouldn't try that play against a very loose player, who is sure to call with kings.
To use all the poker tools at your disposal, you need to adjust your play according to the game and according to the individual players in the game.
Many aggressive players fail to devaluate their legitimate hands when they sit down in a tight game. They steal money with bluffs and semi-bluffs, but when they get a decent hand, they wind up losing. Then they mumble to themselves, "If I just never got a hand, I'd be doing great because it's with my good hands that I lose." What they fail to realize is that in a tight game the value of a hand goes down because players who stay in the pot will have good hands themselves - better hands on average than players in a regular game would have.
In a tight game, then, you loosen up on bluffs and semi-bluffs, but you tighten up on your legitimate hands. Nor would you play as many drawing hands in a tight game, since you'd be getting pot odds sufficient to make it worthwhile less often, and when you did hit, you wouldn't get paid off as much as you would in an average or in a loose game.
Summary
Scrap the general notion that you play tight in a loose game and loose in a tight game and use the following guidelines instead. In a loose game you must tighten up on your bluffs and semi-bluffs, but loosen up on your legitimate hands. You bluff less, but you bet for value more. You also call with more hands and play more drawing hands. In a tight game you loosen up on your bluffs and semi-bluffs, but you must tighten up your legitimate hand requirements.
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The mathematical principle here is the same as the principle that governs bluffing against more than one opponent. See Chapter Eighteen.
You bluff more, but you bet for value less. You also call less and give up more quickly with drawing hands.
These guidelines can also be applied to individual players, as well as to games. When a very tight player with
raises in a small-ante seven stud game and everyone ahead of you folds, you would probably throw away a pair of jacks. You've tightened up your requirements because the chances are good your opponent already has you beat with a pair of kings. But when a very loose player raises in the same spot and everyone ahead of you folds, you might reraise with jacks, not as a semi-bluff but as a bet for value.
On the other hand, if you had
you might semi-bluff raise the very tight player who's betting a pair of kings since there's a decent chance that player will throw away the best hand, fearing you have aces. You wouldn't try that play against a very loose player, who is sure to call with kings.
To use all the poker tools at your disposal, you need to adjust your play according to the game and according to the individual players in the game.
Come Hands in Loose Games
In contrast to other semi-bluff hands and small pairs, come hands increase in value with many players in the pot because you are usually getting excellent pot odds to draw to them. Furthermore, when the game is loose, you figure to get paid off well once you've made a straight or a flush. Therefore, in a loose game with several players in the pot, you should play more drawing hands, such as big three-flushes on fourth street in seven-card stud, than you would usually play.
In loose games, then, you should tighten up considerably on semi-bluffs but loosen up with legitimate hands. However, you would not play loose with marginal hands like two small pair or one medium pair when several opponents are in the pot.
In loose games, then, you should tighten up considerably on semi-bluffs but loosen up with legitimate hands. However, you would not play loose with marginal hands like two small pair or one medium pair when several opponents are in the pot.
Legitimate Hands in Loose Games
What about legitimate hands? In a loose game people are willing to play a hand that is relatively lower in value than the average. Therefore, your own legitimate hands don't need to be quite as good as in a normal game since your opponents are likely to be staying with you with even worse hands. This becomes especially true when you get heads-up against one opponent.
However, because of the action and the participants' style of play, loose games frequently tend to have multi-way pots. With many players staying in, you would be wrong to loosen up with hands like two small pair or one medium pair. Even though these marginal hands might be favorites to hold up against each of several loose opponents individually, chances are they will lose when there are several opponents in the pot. By the same token, if you bet with these hands, you are much less likely to get two, three, or four opponents to fold, particularly when they are loose players, than you are to get one opponent to fold.7
However, because of the action and the participants' style of play, loose games frequently tend to have multi-way pots. With many players staying in, you would be wrong to loosen up with hands like two small pair or one medium pair. Even though these marginal hands might be favorites to hold up against each of several loose opponents individually, chances are they will lose when there are several opponents in the pot. By the same token, if you bet with these hands, you are much less likely to get two, three, or four opponents to fold, particularly when they are loose players, than you are to get one opponent to fold.7
Loose Games. Semi-Bluffs in Loose Games
Remember that in a normal game, semi-bluffs have three ways of winning - by making the best hand later, by catching a scare card to make opponents fold later, or by making opponents fold immediately. It is these three possible ways of winning that make semi-bluffs profitable plays. But what is likely to happen in a loose game? First, loose players don't fold easily, so your semi-bluffs will rarely win immediately. Second, when you catch a scare card that doesn't really help your hand, loose players are more likely to want to "keep you honest" with a call than are average and tight players. Consequently, one of the ways a semi-bluff can win - when opponents fold immediately - has been all but completely eliminated; and a second way - when you catch scare cards - becomes doubtful. Without these two extra ways of winning, semi-bluffs no longer have positive expectation. Therefore, you must abandon most semi-bluffs when there's a high probability that the only way they can win is by improving to the best hand. With respect to semi-bluffing, then, it's true that you must play much tighter in a loose game.
Loose and Tight Play
Loose poker players play a large percentage of hands. They have relatively low starting requirements, and they continue in the pot with relatively weak hands. Tight players play a small percentage of hands. Their starting requirements are high, and they are quick to throw away weak hands that don't develop into big hands. Some players always play loose. Others always play tight. Good players adjust their play to the game.
In Chapter Four we saw how the size of the ante relative to later bets is a primary consideration in deciding how loose or tight you should play. The higher the ante, the looser you play. The smaller the ante, the lighter you play. With a high ante, there is more money in the pot from the start; and the more money there is in the pot, the better pot odds you are getting to play hands that might not be worth playing were the ante very small. With a small ante, on the other hand, there's no point in gambling with marginal hands, especially when you know other players in the game are likely to be betting and calling only with big hands
Which brings us to a second consideration in deciding how loose or tight to play - namely, the way in which the other players in the game play. Assuming a normal ante - about 10 percent of the average future bets - it is commonly believed that when the players in the game play loose, you should play tight, and when the players in the game play tight, you should play loose. There is some truth to this principle. For example, you can steal antes with anything (a loose play) much more successfully against tight players, who will fold their marginal hands, than you can against loose players, who are likely to call you with those same hands. However, the principle of playing loose against tight players and tight against loose players is in need of refinement.
In Chapter Four we saw how the size of the ante relative to later bets is a primary consideration in deciding how loose or tight you should play. The higher the ante, the looser you play. The smaller the ante, the lighter you play. With a high ante, there is more money in the pot from the start; and the more money there is in the pot, the better pot odds you are getting to play hands that might not be worth playing were the ante very small. With a small ante, on the other hand, there's no point in gambling with marginal hands, especially when you know other players in the game are likely to be betting and calling only with big hands
Which brings us to a second consideration in deciding how loose or tight to play - namely, the way in which the other players in the game play. Assuming a normal ante - about 10 percent of the average future bets - it is commonly believed that when the players in the game play loose, you should play tight, and when the players in the game play tight, you should play loose. There is some truth to this principle. For example, you can steal antes with anything (a loose play) much more successfully against tight players, who will fold their marginal hands, than you can against loose players, who are likely to call you with those same hands. However, the principle of playing loose against tight players and tight against loose players is in need of refinement.
Requirements for Slowplaying
In most cases, for a slowplay to be correct, all of the following must be true.
1. You must have a very strong hand.
2. The free card or cheap card you are allowing other players to get must have good possibilities of making them a second-best hand.
3. That same free card must have little chance of making someone a better hand than yours or even giving that person a draw to a better hand than yours on the next round with sufficient odds to justify a call.
4. You must be sure you will drive other players out by showing aggression, but you have a good chance of winning a big pot if you don't.
5. The pot must not yet be very large.
Point 1, having a strong hand, needs to be true for points 2 and 3 to be true. Suppose in seven-card stud you have made a full house in five cards, and it looks as if your opponents are on flush draws and straight draws. When you slowplay and give them a free card, you would like all of them to make their hands so that you will get more action when you bet. At the same time, you are not worried that a free card will give them better hands than yours or draws to better hands
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with proper odds to chase. (However, you should not slowplay against these come hands if you think they would call when you bet.) In contrast, with three-of-a-kind in this situation, you should probably bet right out since there is a good chance a free card will allow one or more of your opponents to draw out on you when you don't make a full house.
Points 4 and 5 are also related. Opponents are much less likely to call a bet when the pot is small than when it is fairly large. As the pot gets larger, it becomes less and less likely that a slowplay is the correct play. The reason is that your opponents are getting larger and larger pot odds, and it is less and less likely that you could actually want them to get these odds. Therefore, when the pot becomes large, you are less inclined to slowplay because the odds you are giving opponents are so great that they can probably take them and not make much of a mistake, if any mistake at all. Furthermore, since opponents are unlikely to fold when the pot is large, it is not necessary to slowplay to keep them from folding.
Nor should you slowplay when you are showing obvious strength on board. Most players will know what you are doing, and they will not pay you off when you bet later. Players who don't know what you are doing, despite the strength of your board, will call an early bet anyway if they have any kind of hand.
When you are slowplaying, you are giving your opponents free cards or cheap cards. The Fundamental Theorem of Poker suggests such a play is incorrect unless your expectation is to show on a later round a larger profit than you would expect if you bet early. In other words, your deception has to have more implied value than what you would gain by betting immediately. At the same time, it is important that when your opponent calls on a later round, after getting a free or a cheap card, he is still not getting proper odds. Otherwise, it cannot be right to give him that free or cheap card, for you have given him the opportunity to develop a hand he is justified in playing even if it is not yet the best hand. Before slowplaying, then, you should make sure there is little chance you will be outdrawn. In seven stud and hold 'em games, you must be especially careful that you are not up against a possible straight draw or a flush draw unless, as we noted earlier, you have a straight or a flush beat already.
Ironically, you would tend to slowplay with excellent hands but not with the pure nuts. With the pure nuts you should bet and raise immediately in case someone else has a strong hand too. Don't make the mistake made by a friend of mine who flopped a straight flush in hold 'em. He kept checking it on a slowplay only to find someone else was doing the same with an ace-high flush.
To elucidate this point further, let's take two situations from draw lowball. If the player to your right raises the blind, you should just call in middle position with a pat
You have a strong hand and hope other players will call the original raiser and stay around for the draw. At the same time, there is the slim possibility that the original raiser has you beat. However, with a pat bicycle - A,2,3,4,5 - you'd like to win some money from the first raiser. So you should reraise in the hope he has a monster and is happy to reraise you. The other players will probably fold, but you might beat the original raiser out of many bets before he discovers you have the pure nuts.
Summary
Slowplaying is an extremely effective way to get good value for your strong hands, but since you are giving weaker hands free or cheap cards, you must slowplay with caution. You must have a very strong hand. You shouldn't slowplay when your strength is obvious or when the pot is large. Nor should you slowplay when a cheap or free card has a fair chance of giving an opponent a better hand than yours or a justifiable draw. For example, in seven-card stud an obvious straight bets into your hidden ace-king-high flush. You might just call if there are other flush draws around. But if you have only a king-high flush, you should raise to make it as costly as possible for higher flush draws to call and possibly draw out on you. Ideally a good slowplay occurs when, by making the hand they are hoping to make, opponents still end up second-best - i.e., when they are drawing dead. However, so long as your opponents will still not be getting proper odds after receiving a free card or a cheap card, a slowplay is worth considering.
1. You must have a very strong hand.
2. The free card or cheap card you are allowing other players to get must have good possibilities of making them a second-best hand.
3. That same free card must have little chance of making someone a better hand than yours or even giving that person a draw to a better hand than yours on the next round with sufficient odds to justify a call.
4. You must be sure you will drive other players out by showing aggression, but you have a good chance of winning a big pot if you don't.
5. The pot must not yet be very large.
Point 1, having a strong hand, needs to be true for points 2 and 3 to be true. Suppose in seven-card stud you have made a full house in five cards, and it looks as if your opponents are on flush draws and straight draws. When you slowplay and give them a free card, you would like all of them to make their hands so that you will get more action when you bet. At the same time, you are not worried that a free card will give them better hands than yours or draws to better hands
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with proper odds to chase. (However, you should not slowplay against these come hands if you think they would call when you bet.) In contrast, with three-of-a-kind in this situation, you should probably bet right out since there is a good chance a free card will allow one or more of your opponents to draw out on you when you don't make a full house.
Points 4 and 5 are also related. Opponents are much less likely to call a bet when the pot is small than when it is fairly large. As the pot gets larger, it becomes less and less likely that a slowplay is the correct play. The reason is that your opponents are getting larger and larger pot odds, and it is less and less likely that you could actually want them to get these odds. Therefore, when the pot becomes large, you are less inclined to slowplay because the odds you are giving opponents are so great that they can probably take them and not make much of a mistake, if any mistake at all. Furthermore, since opponents are unlikely to fold when the pot is large, it is not necessary to slowplay to keep them from folding.
Nor should you slowplay when you are showing obvious strength on board. Most players will know what you are doing, and they will not pay you off when you bet later. Players who don't know what you are doing, despite the strength of your board, will call an early bet anyway if they have any kind of hand.
When you are slowplaying, you are giving your opponents free cards or cheap cards. The Fundamental Theorem of Poker suggests such a play is incorrect unless your expectation is to show on a later round a larger profit than you would expect if you bet early. In other words, your deception has to have more implied value than what you would gain by betting immediately. At the same time, it is important that when your opponent calls on a later round, after getting a free or a cheap card, he is still not getting proper odds. Otherwise, it cannot be right to give him that free or cheap card, for you have given him the opportunity to develop a hand he is justified in playing even if it is not yet the best hand. Before slowplaying, then, you should make sure there is little chance you will be outdrawn. In seven stud and hold 'em games, you must be especially careful that you are not up against a possible straight draw or a flush draw unless, as we noted earlier, you have a straight or a flush beat already.
Ironically, you would tend to slowplay with excellent hands but not with the pure nuts. With the pure nuts you should bet and raise immediately in case someone else has a strong hand too. Don't make the mistake made by a friend of mine who flopped a straight flush in hold 'em. He kept checking it on a slowplay only to find someone else was doing the same with an ace-high flush.
To elucidate this point further, let's take two situations from draw lowball. If the player to your right raises the blind, you should just call in middle position with a pat
You have a strong hand and hope other players will call the original raiser and stay around for the draw. At the same time, there is the slim possibility that the original raiser has you beat. However, with a pat bicycle - A,2,3,4,5 - you'd like to win some money from the first raiser. So you should reraise in the hope he has a monster and is happy to reraise you. The other players will probably fold, but you might beat the original raiser out of many bets before he discovers you have the pure nuts.
Summary
Slowplaying is an extremely effective way to get good value for your strong hands, but since you are giving weaker hands free or cheap cards, you must slowplay with caution. You must have a very strong hand. You shouldn't slowplay when your strength is obvious or when the pot is large. Nor should you slowplay when a cheap or free card has a fair chance of giving an opponent a better hand than yours or a justifiable draw. For example, in seven-card stud an obvious straight bets into your hidden ace-king-high flush. You might just call if there are other flush draws around. But if you have only a king-high flush, you should raise to make it as costly as possible for higher flush draws to call and possibly draw out on you. Ideally a good slowplay occurs when, by making the hand they are hoping to make, opponents still end up second-best - i.e., when they are drawing dead. However, so long as your opponents will still not be getting proper odds after receiving a free card or a cheap card, a slowplay is worth considering.
Slowplaying Versus Check-Raising
Slowplaying is not the same thing. It is playing a hand weakly on one round of betting in order to suck people in for later bets. Typical slowplays are to check if there has been no bet or just call a bet rather than raise. In other words, you take no action beyond what is necessary to stay in the pot. You give nothing away about the strength of your hand.
When you check-raise you usually want to reduce the number of your opponents, but when you slowplay you are Crying to keep as many players in the pot as you can, expecting to collect later bets from them as a result of your early deception. Obviously, since you are not worried about having many players in the pot and are not particularly concerned about giving them free cards, you must have a very strong hand to slowplay - much stronger than a hand with which you would check-raise. In seven-card stud it might be three-of-a-kind on the first three cards or a flush or full house against one pair. In hold 'em it might be the top set of trips after the flop with no possible straight or flush draw showing. In draw lowball it might be something like a pat
When you check-raise you usually want to reduce the number of your opponents, but when you slowplay you are Crying to keep as many players in the pot as you can, expecting to collect later bets from them as a result of your early deception. Obviously, since you are not worried about having many players in the pot and are not particularly concerned about giving them free cards, you must have a very strong hand to slowplay - much stronger than a hand with which you would check-raise. In seven-card stud it might be three-of-a-kind on the first three cards or a flush or full house against one pair. In hold 'em it might be the top set of trips after the flop with no possible straight or flush draw showing. In draw lowball it might be something like a pat
Slowplaying
As we saw in the last chapter, check-raising is playing a hand weakly in order to raise later in the same round of betting. It is possible that you will win the pot right there when you check-raise. At the very least, you will probably reduce the opposition to one or two players, which is what you usually want.
Friday, May 16, 2008
Check-Raising With a Second-Best Hand
While you generally check-raise because you think you have the best hand, it is frequently correct to check-raise with a second-best hand if the play will drive other opponents out. The principle here is identical to the principle of raising with what you think is the second-best hand as it was explained in Chapter Nine and Chapter Thirteen. If the probable best hand is to your immediate right, you can check, wait for that player to bet, then raise so that the rest of the table will fold rather than call a double bet. While you may not be the favorite, you have still increased your chances of winning the pot, and you have the extra equity of whatever dead money is in the pot from earlier betting rounds.
Sometimes you can check-raise with a come hand like a four-flush if there are many people in the pot already and you don't expect a reraise, for you are getting good enough odds, especially if you have a couple of cards to come. This play should usually be made only when the probable bettor is to your immediate left; (hen the other players will call that bettor before they realize you are putting in a raise. You do not want to drive players out because you want to get the correct odds for your raise,
Summary
The factors you must consider when you plan to check-raise are:
1. The strength of your hand.
2. Whether someone behind you will bet after you check. 3 The position of the probable bettor.
To check-raise with a hand with which you want to thin out the field, you want the probable bettor to your right so that people will have to call a double bet to stay in. With a very strong hand and with most come hands, you want the probable bettor to your
left so the other players in the hand might call that bettor's single bet and then be invited to call your raise.
Sometimes you can check-raise with a come hand like a four-flush if there are many people in the pot already and you don't expect a reraise, for you are getting good enough odds, especially if you have a couple of cards to come. This play should usually be made only when the probable bettor is to your immediate left; (hen the other players will call that bettor before they realize you are putting in a raise. You do not want to drive players out because you want to get the correct odds for your raise,
Summary
The factors you must consider when you plan to check-raise are:
1. The strength of your hand.
2. Whether someone behind you will bet after you check. 3 The position of the probable bettor.
To check-raise with a hand with which you want to thin out the field, you want the probable bettor to your right so that people will have to call a double bet to stay in. With a very strong hand and with most come hands, you want the probable bettor to your
left so the other players in the hand might call that bettor's single bet and then be invited to call your raise.
Check-Raising and Position
When you plan to check-raise with several players still in the pot, you need to consider the position of the player you expect will bet because that position determines the kind of hand you check-raise with, to a large extent, Let's say you have made hidden kings up on fifth street, and the player representing queens is to your right. Kings up is a fairly good hand but not a great hand, and you'd like to get everybody out so they don't draw out on your two pair. You check, and when the player with queens bets, you raise. You arc forcing everyone else in the hand to call a double bet, the original bet and your immediate raise, and they will almost certainly fold. You don't mind the queens calling your raise, for you're a big favorite over that player. However, if he folds, that's fine too.
Now we'll place the player representing queens to your left instead of to your right. In this case you should bet with kings up even though you know the player with queens will bet if you check and even though you think you have the best hand. When you bet in this spot, you are hoping the queens will raise so that the double bet will drive out the other players in the pot, just as your check-raise was meant to do in the other instance. And if that opponent does raise, you can now reraise.
Suppose that instead of kings up, the king on fifth street gives you three kings. Now you are much stronger than you were with two pair, and your hand can tolerate callers. Therefore, you would use the opposite strategy you employed with kings up. With the probable bettor to your right, you should bet, and after everyone calls, you hope that bettor raises so that people will be calling a single bet twice (which they are much more likely to do than to call a double bet once).5 On the other hand, if the probable bettor is to your left, then you check the three kings, and after that player bets and everyone calls, you raise. Once again, you arc inviting your opponents to call a single bet twice and not a double bet once.
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5 This situation occurs when you only call the raiser. Often the better play is to reraise.
In sum, the way you bet or check-raise depends on the strength of your hand in relation to what you can see of the other hands and the position of the player you expect to bet or raise behind you when you check or bet. With a fairly good hand, like kings up or aces up in seven stud, you try to make opponents call a double bet because you'd like to drive them out With a very good hand like three kings or three aces you play to induce your opponents to call a single bet; then you confront them with having to call another single bet. In this case, you don't mind their staying in since you're a big favorite over them.
Now we'll place the player representing queens to your left instead of to your right. In this case you should bet with kings up even though you know the player with queens will bet if you check and even though you think you have the best hand. When you bet in this spot, you are hoping the queens will raise so that the double bet will drive out the other players in the pot, just as your check-raise was meant to do in the other instance. And if that opponent does raise, you can now reraise.
Suppose that instead of kings up, the king on fifth street gives you three kings. Now you are much stronger than you were with two pair, and your hand can tolerate callers. Therefore, you would use the opposite strategy you employed with kings up. With the probable bettor to your right, you should bet, and after everyone calls, you hope that bettor raises so that people will be calling a single bet twice (which they are much more likely to do than to call a double bet once).5 On the other hand, if the probable bettor is to your left, then you check the three kings, and after that player bets and everyone calls, you raise. Once again, you arc inviting your opponents to call a single bet twice and not a double bet once.
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5 This situation occurs when you only call the raiser. Often the better play is to reraise.
In sum, the way you bet or check-raise depends on the strength of your hand in relation to what you can see of the other hands and the position of the player you expect to bet or raise behind you when you check or bet. With a fairly good hand, like kings up or aces up in seven stud, you try to make opponents call a double bet because you'd like to drive them out With a very good hand like three kings or three aces you play to induce your opponents to call a single bet; then you confront them with having to call another single bet. In this case, you don't mind their staying in since you're a big favorite over them.
Necessary Conditions for Check-Raising
Two conditions art needed to check-raise for value- that is, when you expect you might be called by a worse hand. First, you must think you have the best hand, but not such a great hand that a slowplay would be proper Second, you must be quite sure someone behind you will bet if you check. Let's say on fourth street in seven-card stud someone bets with
you're getting sufficient pot odds to call. Now on fifth street you catch a king to make kings up. Here you might check-raise if you are pretty sure the player representing queens will bet.
This second condition - namely, that someone behind you will bet after you check - is very important. When you plan to check-raise, you should always keep in mind that you could be making a serious, double-edged mistake if you check and no one bets behind you. You are giving a free card to opponents who would have folded your bet, and in addition you are losing a bet from those who would have called. So you had better be very sure the check-raise will work before you try it.
you're getting sufficient pot odds to call. Now on fifth street you catch a king to make kings up. Here you might check-raise if you are pretty sure the player representing queens will bet.
This second condition - namely, that someone behind you will bet after you check - is very important. When you plan to check-raise, you should always keep in mind that you could be making a serious, double-edged mistake if you check and no one bets behind you. You are giving a free card to opponents who would have folded your bet, and in addition you are losing a bet from those who would have called. So you had better be very sure the check-raise will work before you try it.
The Ethics of Check-Raising
There are some amateur poker players who find something reprehensible about check-raising. They find it devious and deceitful and consider people who use it to be less than well-bred. Well, check-raising is devious and it is deceitful, but being devious and deceitful is precisely what one wants to be in a poker game, as is implied by the Fundamental Theorem of Poker.
Checking with the intention of raising is one way to do that. In a sense, check-raising and slowplaying are the opposites of bluffing, in which you play a weak hand strongly. If check-raising and slowplaying were not permitted, the game of poker would lose just about as much as it would if bluffing and semi-bluffing were not permitted. Indeed the two types of play complement one another, and a good player should be adept at both of them. The check-raise; is a powerful weapon. It is simply another tool with which a poker player practices his art. Not allowing check-raising in your home game is something like not allowing, say, the hit and run in a baseball game or the option pass in a football game. Without it poker loses a significant portion of its strategy, which, apart from winning money, is what makes the game fun. I'm much more willing to congratulate an opponent for trapping me in a check-raise than for drawing out on me on a call he shouldn't have made in the first place - and if I am angry at anyone, it is at myself for falling into the trap.
Checking with the intention of raising is one way to do that. In a sense, check-raising and slowplaying are the opposites of bluffing, in which you play a weak hand strongly. If check-raising and slowplaying were not permitted, the game of poker would lose just about as much as it would if bluffing and semi-bluffing were not permitted. Indeed the two types of play complement one another, and a good player should be adept at both of them. The check-raise; is a powerful weapon. It is simply another tool with which a poker player practices his art. Not allowing check-raising in your home game is something like not allowing, say, the hit and run in a baseball game or the option pass in a football game. Without it poker loses a significant portion of its strategy, which, apart from winning money, is what makes the game fun. I'm much more willing to congratulate an opponent for trapping me in a check-raise than for drawing out on me on a call he shouldn't have made in the first place - and if I am angry at anyone, it is at myself for falling into the trap.
Check-Raising
Check-raising and slowplaying are two ways of playing a strong hand weakly to trap your opponents and win more money from them. However, they are not identical. Check-raising is checking your hand with the intention of raising on the same round after an opponent bets. Slowplaying, which we discuss in more detail in the next chapter, is playing your hand in a way that gives your opponents no idea of its strength. It may be checking and then just calling an opponent who bets, or it may be calling a person who bets ahead of you. When you slowplay a hand, you are using deception to keep people in for a while in order to make your move in a later round. Clearly, then, a hand you slowplay has to be much stronger than a hand with which you check-raise. Check-raising can drive opponents out and may even win the put right there, while slowplaying gives opponents either a free card or a relatively cheap card.
Raising Versus Folding or Calling
Raising is often a better alternative than folding, with calling the worst of the three, Such situations occur frequently when there are several players in the pot. Thus, when you raise with two 10s against someone betting on the come and succeed in driving better hands out, you show a profit on the hand in the long run. However, when you don't want to try this play, calling cannot be profitable because you are too big an underdog.
Similarly, we have noted it may be correct to raise with what is possibly the second-best hand if your raise will drive third-, fourth-, and fifth-best hands out - usually straight and/or flush draws. However, if you know those players are not going to get out when you raise, all of a sudden your hand might not be worth even a call. Not only is there a good chance you're already beat by the bettor, but frequently you'll get caught from behind by one of the drawing hands. When you cannot get the drawing hands out by raising, you have so many ways of losing that your best alternative is to fold.
Let's say in five-card draw you have two 3s and two 2s before the draw. You are in a game where people are going to come in behind you with medium-sized pairs. If you want to play the hand, you must raise to drive all medium-sized pairs out. In this case you're not interested in cutting down your opponents1 odds, because you can never cut them down sufficiently as far as your hand is concerned. You want them out of the hand, pure and simple. If they stay, you have too many ways to lose since any two pair beat you unless you hit a lucky 11-to-l shot and make a full house. Therefore, if for some reason you choose not to raise or if you think raising will not drive out the people with the medium pairs, then your only alternative is to throw away your two tiny pair. They simply have too little chance of winning in a multi-way pot to make it worth calling. You must either raise or fold.
As we discussed previously, raising is better than calling against a possible semi-bluff when your hand is too good to fold. It is better for a variety of reasons, It gives you control of the hand. It sometimes allows you to win the pot right there. It allows you to take a free card on the next round when you need to. It prevents your opponent from getting a cheap card that will beat you when he is on a semi-bluff. It disguises your hand so that you might very well win when a worthless scare card falls. Raising against a possible semi-bluff is so much better than calling (except in the three situations described at the end of the last chapter) that unless you can raise, you're usually better off folding.
Frequently a semi-bluff raise is indicated even though a call would be clearly unprofitable. Let's say you have a four-flush with one card to come. You know the odds against making the flush are 4-to-1, and your opponent bets $20 into a $40 pot. That is, he's offering you 3-to-l odds on a 4-to-l shot. You cannot usually call the bet since a call has negative expectation unless you are almost sure of winning a double bet on the end when you hit the flush. In 100 identical situations you will win only 20 times on average and lose 80 times. That is, you will win $60 20 times for a total of $1,200, and you will lose $20 80 times for a total of $ 1,600. Your net loss will be $400 or $4 per hand. So the decision is clear. People who make such calls are perennial losers,
Of course, if you fold, you lose nothing beyond the money you put into the pot in earlier betting rounds. But suppose you read your opponent to be weak - to have, say, only one pair, and you figure there's a 25 percent chance that opponent will fold instantly if you raise. Now, although a call has negative expectation, a semi-bluff raise becomes a profitable play. We'll work it out over 100 average hands, discounting any bets on the end. Your opponent will fold 25 times, and you steal $60 for a total of $1,500. He will call you 75 times, but one-fifth of those times you'll make the flush to beat him. Thus, 15 times you'll win $80 (the $60 in the pot plus your opponent's call of your $20 raise) for a total of $1,200. The remaining 60 times you'll lose $40 (your $20 call and $20 raise) for a total loss of $2,400. After 100 such plays, then, you figure to win $2,700 ($l,500 plus $ 1,200) and lose $2,400 for an average net profit of $300 and a mathematical expectation of $3 per play. The difference between calling incorrectly and raising correctly is a swing of $7 – from a $4 loss per play to a $3 profit.4 What's more, if the bets you might win on the last round when you make the flush were included, your expectation would be even greater.
Summary
Some players are wary of raising, especially in situations like the one just described. However, raising should not be a rare play in your arsenal. Whether to get more money in the pot, to drive players out, to semi-bluff, or for any other reason, you should not hesitate to raise when strategic, financial, or mathematical considerations demand it. Furthermore, raising may often be the best alternative to folding, while calling is altogether incorrect. A lot of average players find this concept hard to believe, yet as we have seen, it is indisputably true. It further emphasizes the adage that a caller in poker is a loser in poker.
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4Mathematically your semi-bluff raise would still be a profitable play as long as your opponent were to fold more than four times out of nineteen.
Similarly, we have noted it may be correct to raise with what is possibly the second-best hand if your raise will drive third-, fourth-, and fifth-best hands out - usually straight and/or flush draws. However, if you know those players are not going to get out when you raise, all of a sudden your hand might not be worth even a call. Not only is there a good chance you're already beat by the bettor, but frequently you'll get caught from behind by one of the drawing hands. When you cannot get the drawing hands out by raising, you have so many ways of losing that your best alternative is to fold.
Let's say in five-card draw you have two 3s and two 2s before the draw. You are in a game where people are going to come in behind you with medium-sized pairs. If you want to play the hand, you must raise to drive all medium-sized pairs out. In this case you're not interested in cutting down your opponents1 odds, because you can never cut them down sufficiently as far as your hand is concerned. You want them out of the hand, pure and simple. If they stay, you have too many ways to lose since any two pair beat you unless you hit a lucky 11-to-l shot and make a full house. Therefore, if for some reason you choose not to raise or if you think raising will not drive out the people with the medium pairs, then your only alternative is to throw away your two tiny pair. They simply have too little chance of winning in a multi-way pot to make it worth calling. You must either raise or fold.
As we discussed previously, raising is better than calling against a possible semi-bluff when your hand is too good to fold. It is better for a variety of reasons, It gives you control of the hand. It sometimes allows you to win the pot right there. It allows you to take a free card on the next round when you need to. It prevents your opponent from getting a cheap card that will beat you when he is on a semi-bluff. It disguises your hand so that you might very well win when a worthless scare card falls. Raising against a possible semi-bluff is so much better than calling (except in the three situations described at the end of the last chapter) that unless you can raise, you're usually better off folding.
Frequently a semi-bluff raise is indicated even though a call would be clearly unprofitable. Let's say you have a four-flush with one card to come. You know the odds against making the flush are 4-to-1, and your opponent bets $20 into a $40 pot. That is, he's offering you 3-to-l odds on a 4-to-l shot. You cannot usually call the bet since a call has negative expectation unless you are almost sure of winning a double bet on the end when you hit the flush. In 100 identical situations you will win only 20 times on average and lose 80 times. That is, you will win $60 20 times for a total of $1,200, and you will lose $20 80 times for a total of $ 1,600. Your net loss will be $400 or $4 per hand. So the decision is clear. People who make such calls are perennial losers,
Of course, if you fold, you lose nothing beyond the money you put into the pot in earlier betting rounds. But suppose you read your opponent to be weak - to have, say, only one pair, and you figure there's a 25 percent chance that opponent will fold instantly if you raise. Now, although a call has negative expectation, a semi-bluff raise becomes a profitable play. We'll work it out over 100 average hands, discounting any bets on the end. Your opponent will fold 25 times, and you steal $60 for a total of $1,500. He will call you 75 times, but one-fifth of those times you'll make the flush to beat him. Thus, 15 times you'll win $80 (the $60 in the pot plus your opponent's call of your $20 raise) for a total of $1,200. The remaining 60 times you'll lose $40 (your $20 call and $20 raise) for a total loss of $2,400. After 100 such plays, then, you figure to win $2,700 ($l,500 plus $ 1,200) and lose $2,400 for an average net profit of $300 and a mathematical expectation of $3 per play. The difference between calling incorrectly and raising correctly is a swing of $7 – from a $4 loss per play to a $3 profit.4 What's more, if the bets you might win on the last round when you make the flush were included, your expectation would be even greater.
Summary
Some players are wary of raising, especially in situations like the one just described. However, raising should not be a rare play in your arsenal. Whether to get more money in the pot, to drive players out, to semi-bluff, or for any other reason, you should not hesitate to raise when strategic, financial, or mathematical considerations demand it. Furthermore, raising may often be the best alternative to folding, while calling is altogether incorrect. A lot of average players find this concept hard to believe, yet as we have seen, it is indisputably true. It further emphasizes the adage that a caller in poker is a loser in poker.
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4Mathematically your semi-bluff raise would still be a profitable play as long as your opponent were to fold more than four times out of nineteen.
Raising to Drive Out Better Hands When a Come Hand Bets
Let's say on fifth street in seven stud you have two 10s, and the player to your right bets with an obvious flush draw. You know there are a couple of players behind you with higher pairs than yours. Nevertheless, you may be in a position to raise if you think the better hands will fold rather than call a double bet. When they do fold, you become the favorite heads-up against the come hand, and if that player misses his flush, your raise on fifth street has won you the pot. The player betting on the come was expecting at least two callers in order to get proper odds for his bet. Your raise turns that bet into a mistake since he is not getting a proper return for his investment. At the same time, when the players behind you fold after you raise, they too are making a mistake since their hands are better than yours.
On the other hand, if you suspect one or both of the higher pairs behind you will call your raise, not only should you not raise, you should not even call the original bet since you are beat in two places and may get beat in a third. This somewhat rare situation is one of those times when your only alternatives are to raise or fold. It is a time when a call is patently incorrect.
On the other hand, if you suspect one or both of the higher pairs behind you will call your raise, not only should you not raise, you should not even call the original bet since you are beat in two places and may get beat in a third. This somewhat rare situation is one of those times when your only alternatives are to raise or fold. It is a time when a call is patently incorrect.
Raising to Drive Out Worse Hands When Your Own May Be Second Best
Depending on the size of the pot and your assessment of your own and your opponents' hands, it may be correct to raise with what you believe may be the second-best hand if you can get the third-, fourth- and fifth-best hands out. The reasons for this play were suggested in an earlier chapter. If, for instance, the bettor has a 50 percent chance of winning the pot, you have a 30 percent chance, and two other hands each have a 10 percent chance, you improve your chances by driving those two worst hands out with a raise. Now the best hand may have a 60 percent chance of winning, but you've improved your own chances to 40 percent. In seven stud you may, for instance, have two kings against a probable two small pair. Two other players behind you appear to be drawing to straights. By raising them out, you almost surely win when you improve to kings up and may win when it turns out your single opponent had only one pair and, say, a flush draw.
However, if the straight draws stay in, you may lose with kings up against an unimproved two pair when one of the straights gets there.
However, if the straight draws stay in, you may lose with kings up against an unimproved two pair when one of the straights gets there.
Raising to Gain Information
Raising simply to gain information is a tricky play and shouldn't be done often. Generally you should consider any information gained as an extra benefit of a raise you are making for other reasons.
There are occasions, though, when you cost yourself less by raising to gain information early than you would if you had not led your opponent into giving his hand away. These occasions usually occur in heads-up situations and only in early betting rounds. Furthermore, your opponent should be the type of player whose response to your raise is likely to reflect the hand he is holding. Otherwise your raise could very well give you wrong information.
What can you learn by raising? Well, if your opponent calls, he probably has a good hand. If he reraises, he probably has a very good hand. (It's for this reason you cannot raise to gain information when your opponent is the sort of player who is capable of a semi-bluff reraise.) If your opponent folds, that, of course, tells you he's weak, and you take down the money. An added benefit to raising to gain information is that sometimes your opponent may fold marginal hands that he shouldn't have folded.
You invest in an early raise to gain information in order to save yourself money later. If, for example, you call on fourth street in seven stud, you may continue to call three more bets only to discover in the showdown that you didn't have a chance from the beginning. But a raise on fourth street followed by a call or a reraise from your opponent allows you to play your hand knowing you're up against considerable strength. Depending upon your own strength, you can then decide whether and how long it's worth continuing in the hand.
Let's say with a pair of kings on fourth street in seven-card stud you raise an open pair of 9s. Your opponent reraises. You decide that opponent has three 9s and fold. By risking one bet (your raise), you save as many as three bets you might otherwise have called on fifth street, sixth street, and on the end. Your savings is even greater when the bet doubles after fourth street. A trial-balloon raise on a $10 round could save you three $20 calls later.
Nevertheless, raising just to gain information is tricky. For example, if that open pair of 9s just calls your raise, can you be sure that opponent doesn't have three 9s? What to do on the next round may still not be clear to you. That is why you should generally reserve your raises for other purposes and consider whatever information you gain from your opponents1 responses as an added benefit.
There are occasions, though, when you cost yourself less by raising to gain information early than you would if you had not led your opponent into giving his hand away. These occasions usually occur in heads-up situations and only in early betting rounds. Furthermore, your opponent should be the type of player whose response to your raise is likely to reflect the hand he is holding. Otherwise your raise could very well give you wrong information.
What can you learn by raising? Well, if your opponent calls, he probably has a good hand. If he reraises, he probably has a very good hand. (It's for this reason you cannot raise to gain information when your opponent is the sort of player who is capable of a semi-bluff reraise.) If your opponent folds, that, of course, tells you he's weak, and you take down the money. An added benefit to raising to gain information is that sometimes your opponent may fold marginal hands that he shouldn't have folded.
You invest in an early raise to gain information in order to save yourself money later. If, for example, you call on fourth street in seven stud, you may continue to call three more bets only to discover in the showdown that you didn't have a chance from the beginning. But a raise on fourth street followed by a call or a reraise from your opponent allows you to play your hand knowing you're up against considerable strength. Depending upon your own strength, you can then decide whether and how long it's worth continuing in the hand.
Let's say with a pair of kings on fourth street in seven-card stud you raise an open pair of 9s. Your opponent reraises. You decide that opponent has three 9s and fold. By risking one bet (your raise), you save as many as three bets you might otherwise have called on fifth street, sixth street, and on the end. Your savings is even greater when the bet doubles after fourth street. A trial-balloon raise on a $10 round could save you three $20 calls later.
Nevertheless, raising just to gain information is tricky. For example, if that open pair of 9s just calls your raise, can you be sure that opponent doesn't have three 9s? What to do on the next round may still not be clear to you. That is why you should generally reserve your raises for other purposes and consider whatever information you gain from your opponents1 responses as an added benefit.
Raising to Get a Free Card
As we just noted, when your semi-bluff raise is called, it may have allowed you the opportunity to get a free card on the next round. However, when you're thinking of raising specifically to get a free card, you should keep in mind two considerations - your position and the cost of the raise.
To get a free card, you must be last to act; if you arc not last and you check, you will have shown weakness. A player behind you with a better hand than yours will probably bet, denying you the chance for a free card. In hold 'em, you can always be sure of your position since it's fixed throughout a hand, but in games like seven-card stud and razz, you often have no guarantee you will be last to act from one round to the next. In seven stud, for instance, the player to your left may have a king high to start the betting, but on the next card the player to your right or you yourself catch an ace. Now you must lead off, which you certainly do not want to do if you're still banking on a free card. So if you have some doubt about securing last position on the next round, raising to get a free card can just cost you money needlessly when it turns out you're not last after all.
Which brings up the second consideration when you're thinking of raising to get a free card - namely, that that free card is not free at all. It costs you the price of your raise. So unless you have other reasons for raising, you would make the play only when the cost of the raise now is cheaper than what you'd have to pay for a call on the next round. In a $10-$20 hold 'em game, for example, in which the bet doubles on fourth street, you might raise S10 after the flop to avoid paying $20 to call a bet on the next round.
Of course, you need not take advantage of the free card option. You certainly wouldn't when you catch the card that makes your hand. Nor would you when you catch a card that looks as if it makes your hand. For example, the holder of the pair of black 7s with Q♠J♠9♠ showing, a hand we discussed in the preceding two chapters, probably knew he had the worst hand and might have taken a free card in the hope of making a flush, but he found it much more profitable to continue the semi-bluff and bet after the 9♠ hit, since only an opponent with a very strong hand could risk a call.
To get a free card, you must be last to act; if you arc not last and you check, you will have shown weakness. A player behind you with a better hand than yours will probably bet, denying you the chance for a free card. In hold 'em, you can always be sure of your position since it's fixed throughout a hand, but in games like seven-card stud and razz, you often have no guarantee you will be last to act from one round to the next. In seven stud, for instance, the player to your left may have a king high to start the betting, but on the next card the player to your right or you yourself catch an ace. Now you must lead off, which you certainly do not want to do if you're still banking on a free card. So if you have some doubt about securing last position on the next round, raising to get a free card can just cost you money needlessly when it turns out you're not last after all.
Which brings up the second consideration when you're thinking of raising to get a free card - namely, that that free card is not free at all. It costs you the price of your raise. So unless you have other reasons for raising, you would make the play only when the cost of the raise now is cheaper than what you'd have to pay for a call on the next round. In a $10-$20 hold 'em game, for example, in which the bet doubles on fourth street, you might raise S10 after the flop to avoid paying $20 to call a bet on the next round.
Of course, you need not take advantage of the free card option. You certainly wouldn't when you catch the card that makes your hand. Nor would you when you catch a card that looks as if it makes your hand. For example, the holder of the pair of black 7s with Q♠J♠9♠ showing, a hand we discussed in the preceding two chapters, probably knew he had the worst hand and might have taken a free card in the hope of making a flush, but he found it much more profitable to continue the semi-bluff and bet after the 9♠ hit, since only an opponent with a very strong hand could risk a call.
Raising to Muff or Semi-Bluff
Raising as a pure bluff with a hand that has no chance of winning if called is a tricky play, too risky to be attempted often. It is usually done only when there are no more cards to come, often when you didn't make the hand you were hoping to make but are trying to convince your opponent you did, Presumably your opponent has a decent hand to bet into you and is reluctant to throw it away when you raise. In limit poker, raising as a pure bluff can succeed often enough to be profitable only against a very tough player who is capable of making super-tough folds. The weaker the player, the more likely he is to call your raise with any kind of hand.
Pure bluff raises are a more important part of no-limit poker. Indeed some world-class no-limit players, like 1982 poker champion Jack Straus, are famous for their ability to bluff raise successfully. However, the fact that bluff raises are more important in no-limit than in limit doesn't make them any less difficult or tricky to use; it only makes them more costly when they are misused. (See Chapters Eighteen and Nineteen for a further discussion of bluff raises and bluffing in general.)
The semi-bluff raise is a more significant and frequently used part of a good poker player's arsenal. As with the pure bluff, you make a semi-bluff raise in the hope of winning the pot right there, but in contrast to the pure bluff, you always semi-bluff with more cards to come and with a hand that can improve, so there is a reasonable chance you will outdraw your opponent and win the pot even when you are called.
As we observed in the last chapter, the semi-bluff raise can also be a good defense against someone else who may be semi-bluffing. When you raise a possible semi-bluffer, that player usually has to throw away a semi-bluff hand. When he calls your raise, you can be pretty sure he has what he's representing. So an added benefit to your semi-bluff raise is that you have gained a bit of information. Furthermore, your opponent may fear you have the best hand, and check to you on the next round, giving you the chance to take a free card.
Thus, even though you may not achieve your primary goal when you raise - in this instance, making your opponent fold a semi-bluff hand - you often achieve secondary goals - such as gaining information and getting a free card. Similarly, when you raise to drive worse hands out but one of your opponents calls {and is getting proper odds for the call), you have at least achieved the secondary goal of getting more money in a pot you think you are the favorite to win.
Pure bluff raises are a more important part of no-limit poker. Indeed some world-class no-limit players, like 1982 poker champion Jack Straus, are famous for their ability to bluff raise successfully. However, the fact that bluff raises are more important in no-limit than in limit doesn't make them any less difficult or tricky to use; it only makes them more costly when they are misused. (See Chapters Eighteen and Nineteen for a further discussion of bluff raises and bluffing in general.)
The semi-bluff raise is a more significant and frequently used part of a good poker player's arsenal. As with the pure bluff, you make a semi-bluff raise in the hope of winning the pot right there, but in contrast to the pure bluff, you always semi-bluff with more cards to come and with a hand that can improve, so there is a reasonable chance you will outdraw your opponent and win the pot even when you are called.
As we observed in the last chapter, the semi-bluff raise can also be a good defense against someone else who may be semi-bluffing. When you raise a possible semi-bluffer, that player usually has to throw away a semi-bluff hand. When he calls your raise, you can be pretty sure he has what he's representing. So an added benefit to your semi-bluff raise is that you have gained a bit of information. Furthermore, your opponent may fear you have the best hand, and check to you on the next round, giving you the chance to take a free card.
Thus, even though you may not achieve your primary goal when you raise - in this instance, making your opponent fold a semi-bluff hand - you often achieve secondary goals - such as gaining information and getting a free card. Similarly, when you raise to drive worse hands out but one of your opponents calls {and is getting proper odds for the call), you have at least achieved the secondary goal of getting more money in a pot you think you are the favorite to win.
Raising as a Means of Cutting Down Opponents' Odds
To illustrate this important point, we'll examine a hand from five card draw poker. You have a pat flush; the player to your right has nothing at all, and the player to your left has two pair. For the purposes of this illustration, we'll assume you know exactly what both opponents have. We'll also assume the betting limit is a flat $10 but that somehow a $100 pot has been created before betting gets under way. With the cards out, we'll say the chances of the two pair improving to a full house are 9-lo-l against. In other words, the player behind you will improve to the best hand one out often times on average.
With absolutely nothing, the player to your right bets $10 in an attempt to steal that big pot. You know this player will fold instantly if you raise, and you are fairly sure the player behind you will fold too. However, if you just call the $10, the player behind you will also call. Consequently, you may win $120 plus perhaps another bet at the end if you call, whereas if you raise you'll most likely have to make do with the $110 already in the pot. Should you call or raise?
The answer, of course, is you should raise, but let's look at the problem logically. The opponent with two pair is a 9-to-1 underdog. If you call, there is $120 in the pot. He would be getting 12-to-1 from the pot for his call when the odds against his making the best hand are only 9-to-1. Therefore, if you call and he calls behind you, he is making the correct play, the play with positive expectation. He will lose $10 in nine hands out of ten on average, for a total loss of $90, but he will win $120 in one hand out of ten for a net profit of $30. He gains on the play, and according to the Fundamental Theorem of Poker, any time your opponent gains, you are costing yourself money.
On the other hand, when you raise, making it $20 for the two pair to call, you are cutting that player's pot odds from $120-to-$10, or 12-to-1, to $130-to-$20, or 61/2-to-l. Since the two pair is a9-to-l underdog and is now getting only 61/2-to-l from the pot, you have made it correct for the two pair to fold. If he plays correctly and does fold, you do better, as we shall see presently, than if you had played incorrectly and allowed him sufficient odds for a call. However, if the two pair plays incorrectly and calls after you raise, you do best of all, because when an opponent makes a mistake, you gain. What your raise did was to reduce correct odds for a call into incorrect odds for a call. The curious effect of this turnabout is that although you raised to drive the two pair out, you are rooting for him to call after you raise.
To prove this point, let's see what happens over ten average hands if:
1. You call, and the two pair calls behind you.
2. You raise, and the two pair folds,
3. You raise, and the two pair calls your raise.
If you call and the two pair calls, you will win nine out of ten hands. Assuming you check after the draw and don't pay your opponent off the one time he makes a full house, you will win $120 (the $110 already in the pot - not counting your own $10 call - plus the two pair's $10 call) nine times for a total of $1,080, and you will lose $10 once. Your net profit is $1,070.
If you raise and the two pair folds, you will win all ten hands, which at $110 per hand comes to $1,100. You win $30 more than you would if you called and the two pair overcalled.
If you raise and the two pair calls, you win $130 (the $110 already in the pot plus the two pair's $20 call of a double bet) nine limes for a total of $1,170 and lose $20 once for a net profit of $1,150. You win $80 more than you do when you call and the two pair overcalls and $50 more than when you raise and your opponent folds.
Taking the $1,100 profit as the norm (since both you and your opponent play correctly in that case), we can say you lose $30 over ten hands or $3 per hand when you play incorrectly and only call, and you win $50 over ten hands or $5 per hand when your opponent plays incorrectly and calls your raise. To repeat, when you raise to drive people out, you are actually raising to cut down their odds. If they fold, that's fine, but sometimes you have cut their odds to a point where you are rooting for them to call after you raise, In no-limit games you can control the odds you are giving your opponents by the amount you bet, and you frequently find yourself rooting for them to call your raise even though you would be rooting for them to fold if you had just called.
Of course, it is correct just to call, as I did in the no-limit hold 'em hand of Chapter Three, when you know your opponent will fold if you raise but would make a mistake by overcalling if he knew what your cards were. You want to give your opponent every opportunity to make a mistake since that mistake is your gain even if he happens to get lucky and win an individual hand because of that mistake. In poker as in any game of skill with an element of chance, you cannot play results. That is, you cannot judge the value of a play because of the way it works out in a specific instance. In backgammon, for example, it's possible for a player to make a mistake or a series of mistakes that results in a hopeless position from which he can extricate himself only by rolling double six. The odds against rolling a double six are 35-to-1. If the hapless player happens to roll that double six and go on to victory, you cannot say he played the game correctly, anymore than you can say a person who puts his money on number 20 on the roulette layout plays correctly when number 20 happens to come up. Both players were just very, very lucky.
To summarize this section, when you raise to drive people out, you are really cutting down their odds. So you should raise with what you think is the best hand only when opponents are getting good enough odds to overcall or when you think an opponent will call a double bet even though he shouldn't even call a single bet.
With absolutely nothing, the player to your right bets $10 in an attempt to steal that big pot. You know this player will fold instantly if you raise, and you are fairly sure the player behind you will fold too. However, if you just call the $10, the player behind you will also call. Consequently, you may win $120 plus perhaps another bet at the end if you call, whereas if you raise you'll most likely have to make do with the $110 already in the pot. Should you call or raise?
The answer, of course, is you should raise, but let's look at the problem logically. The opponent with two pair is a 9-to-1 underdog. If you call, there is $120 in the pot. He would be getting 12-to-1 from the pot for his call when the odds against his making the best hand are only 9-to-1. Therefore, if you call and he calls behind you, he is making the correct play, the play with positive expectation. He will lose $10 in nine hands out of ten on average, for a total loss of $90, but he will win $120 in one hand out of ten for a net profit of $30. He gains on the play, and according to the Fundamental Theorem of Poker, any time your opponent gains, you are costing yourself money.
On the other hand, when you raise, making it $20 for the two pair to call, you are cutting that player's pot odds from $120-to-$10, or 12-to-1, to $130-to-$20, or 61/2-to-l. Since the two pair is a9-to-l underdog and is now getting only 61/2-to-l from the pot, you have made it correct for the two pair to fold. If he plays correctly and does fold, you do better, as we shall see presently, than if you had played incorrectly and allowed him sufficient odds for a call. However, if the two pair plays incorrectly and calls after you raise, you do best of all, because when an opponent makes a mistake, you gain. What your raise did was to reduce correct odds for a call into incorrect odds for a call. The curious effect of this turnabout is that although you raised to drive the two pair out, you are rooting for him to call after you raise.
To prove this point, let's see what happens over ten average hands if:
1. You call, and the two pair calls behind you.
2. You raise, and the two pair folds,
3. You raise, and the two pair calls your raise.
If you call and the two pair calls, you will win nine out of ten hands. Assuming you check after the draw and don't pay your opponent off the one time he makes a full house, you will win $120 (the $110 already in the pot - not counting your own $10 call - plus the two pair's $10 call) nine times for a total of $1,080, and you will lose $10 once. Your net profit is $1,070.
If you raise and the two pair folds, you will win all ten hands, which at $110 per hand comes to $1,100. You win $30 more than you would if you called and the two pair overcalled.
If you raise and the two pair calls, you win $130 (the $110 already in the pot plus the two pair's $20 call of a double bet) nine limes for a total of $1,170 and lose $20 once for a net profit of $1,150. You win $80 more than you do when you call and the two pair overcalls and $50 more than when you raise and your opponent folds.
Taking the $1,100 profit as the norm (since both you and your opponent play correctly in that case), we can say you lose $30 over ten hands or $3 per hand when you play incorrectly and only call, and you win $50 over ten hands or $5 per hand when your opponent plays incorrectly and calls your raise. To repeat, when you raise to drive people out, you are actually raising to cut down their odds. If they fold, that's fine, but sometimes you have cut their odds to a point where you are rooting for them to call after you raise, In no-limit games you can control the odds you are giving your opponents by the amount you bet, and you frequently find yourself rooting for them to call your raise even though you would be rooting for them to fold if you had just called.
Of course, it is correct just to call, as I did in the no-limit hold 'em hand of Chapter Three, when you know your opponent will fold if you raise but would make a mistake by overcalling if he knew what your cards were. You want to give your opponent every opportunity to make a mistake since that mistake is your gain even if he happens to get lucky and win an individual hand because of that mistake. In poker as in any game of skill with an element of chance, you cannot play results. That is, you cannot judge the value of a play because of the way it works out in a specific instance. In backgammon, for example, it's possible for a player to make a mistake or a series of mistakes that results in a hopeless position from which he can extricate himself only by rolling double six. The odds against rolling a double six are 35-to-1. If the hapless player happens to roll that double six and go on to victory, you cannot say he played the game correctly, anymore than you can say a person who puts his money on number 20 on the roulette layout plays correctly when number 20 happens to come up. Both players were just very, very lucky.
To summarize this section, when you raise to drive people out, you are really cutting down their odds. So you should raise with what you think is the best hand only when opponents are getting good enough odds to overcall or when you think an opponent will call a double bet even though he shouldn't even call a single bet.
Raising to Drive Out Opponents
When you raise to get people out, what you are really doing is raising to cut down their odds. In fact, you may sometimes cut their odds so severely that you hope they will call rather than fold after you raise.
By cutting down a person's odds, we mean reducing the amount of money he may win per dollar invested. For example, if there is a $100 pot, someone bets $10, and you call the $10, the player behind you gets 12-to-l odds on a call. That is, that player hopes to win $120 from his $10 call, or $12 per $1 invested. But suppose you raise the initial bettor, making it $20 for the player behind you to call. Now there's $130 in the pot instead of $120, but the player behind you must invest twice as much - $20 - for a chance to win it. You have thus cut his odds almost in half - from $120-to-$10 to $130-to-$20, or from 12-to-l to 61/2-to-1. In so doing, you have created a situation where the player may make a mistake, according to the Fundamental Theorem of Poker, by either calling or folding. Even when he folds correctly after you raise because he is getting insufficient pot odds to call a double bet, you certainly prefer that to his calling an unraised bet correctly and proceeding to outdraw you and win the pot.
By cutting down a person's odds, we mean reducing the amount of money he may win per dollar invested. For example, if there is a $100 pot, someone bets $10, and you call the $10, the player behind you gets 12-to-l odds on a call. That is, that player hopes to win $120 from his $10 call, or $12 per $1 invested. But suppose you raise the initial bettor, making it $20 for the player behind you to call. Now there's $130 in the pot instead of $120, but the player behind you must invest twice as much - $20 - for a chance to win it. You have thus cut his odds almost in half - from $120-to-$10 to $130-to-$20, or from 12-to-l to 61/2-to-1. In so doing, you have created a situation where the player may make a mistake, according to the Fundamental Theorem of Poker, by either calling or folding. Even when he folds correctly after you raise because he is getting insufficient pot odds to call a double bet, you certainly prefer that to his calling an unraised bet correctly and proceeding to outdraw you and win the pot.
Getting More Money In the Pot By Not Raising
Sometimes - even with no more cards to come - you can get more money or at least as much money into a multi-way pot by calling instead of raising, and at the same time avoid the risk of a reraise from the original bettor. You go for the overcall. That is, you call instead of raising in order to extract money from one or more of the players still in the pot behind you.
Suppose, after all the cards are out, the bettor to your right appears to have a hand you can beat. If you raise, that player will probably call, but if he reraises, you're in trouble. At the same lime, there are two players to your left whom you know you have beat. You also know they will call if you call, but they will fold if you raise. In such a situation it becomes absolutely incorrect to raise. You should only call. By calling you figure to win two extra bets from the players behind you, but by raising you will win only one extra bet at most when the original bettor calls your raise, which he may not even do. What's more, your raise could cost you two bets if the original bettor reraises and you fold, or three bets if he reraises and you call with the second best hand. It could also cost you two bets if the original bettor calls your raise and turns out to have the best hand.
The situation at the end need not be so extreme as the one just described to make a flat call correct. Let's look at the following hands:
If you raise with your A, Q high-heart flush, the third player will probably fold, and the original bettor may throw away a small straight and not pay you off either. So you may not gain a thing by raising; at most you'll win one extra bet. And what if the original bettor reraises, which he will do if he has, for example, an A, K high flush, especially since he knows you cannot have the king of hearts? (It's in the third player's hand.) By raising you lose two or three bets instead of the one you would have lost by calling. Furthermore, by just calling, you figure to win one bet from the player behind you when he calls too. So you gain exactly as much as you could have gained by raising, while you risk nothing.
In general, you should not usually raise but try for the overcall whenever all the cards are out and your hand is clearly better than any hand that might overcall behind you but not clearly better than the bettor's.
However, you must realize that to go for the overcall, you must be sure you have the player or players to your left beat. If there is some chance one of them has a better hand than yours but might not call your raise, it is critical that you do raise when you have a decent chance of having the original bettor beaten. You certainly don't want an overcall if it will cost you the pot.
Suppose, after all the cards are out, the bettor to your right appears to have a hand you can beat. If you raise, that player will probably call, but if he reraises, you're in trouble. At the same lime, there are two players to your left whom you know you have beat. You also know they will call if you call, but they will fold if you raise. In such a situation it becomes absolutely incorrect to raise. You should only call. By calling you figure to win two extra bets from the players behind you, but by raising you will win only one extra bet at most when the original bettor calls your raise, which he may not even do. What's more, your raise could cost you two bets if the original bettor reraises and you fold, or three bets if he reraises and you call with the second best hand. It could also cost you two bets if the original bettor calls your raise and turns out to have the best hand.
The situation at the end need not be so extreme as the one just described to make a flat call correct. Let's look at the following hands:
If you raise with your A, Q high-heart flush, the third player will probably fold, and the original bettor may throw away a small straight and not pay you off either. So you may not gain a thing by raising; at most you'll win one extra bet. And what if the original bettor reraises, which he will do if he has, for example, an A, K high flush, especially since he knows you cannot have the king of hearts? (It's in the third player's hand.) By raising you lose two or three bets instead of the one you would have lost by calling. Furthermore, by just calling, you figure to win one bet from the player behind you when he calls too. So you gain exactly as much as you could have gained by raising, while you risk nothing.
In general, you should not usually raise but try for the overcall whenever all the cards are out and your hand is clearly better than any hand that might overcall behind you but not clearly better than the bettor's.
However, you must realize that to go for the overcall, you must be sure you have the player or players to your left beat. If there is some chance one of them has a better hand than yours but might not call your raise, it is critical that you do raise when you have a decent chance of having the original bettor beaten. You certainly don't want an overcall if it will cost you the pot.
Raising
According to the Fundamental Theorem of Poker, you gain when your opponents play a hand differently from the way they would if they knew what you had. Any time you raise, for whatever specific tactical reason, you are doing so to avoid making a mistake yourself, according to the Fundamental Theorem, and to cause your opponents to make mistakes. There are numerous reasons for raising. Many have been discussed in various contexts in earlier chapters. In this chapter we will review all these reasons and explain several of them in more detail. We will also explain how raising is an extension of the Fundamental Theorem of Poker.
We reduce the principal reasons for raising to seven:
1. To get more money in the pot when you have the best hand.
2. To drive out opponents when you have the best hand.
3. To bluff or semi-bluff.
4. To get a free card.
5. To gain information.
6. To drive out worse hands when your own hand may be second best.
7. To drive out better hands when a come hand bets.
Now let's look at each of these reasons individually.
Raising to Get More Money in the Pot
Getting more money in the pot is the primary reason to raise when you think you have the best hand. Clearly you would raise a single opponent on the end with what you think is the best hand, but on earlier rounds you must always decide whether it's worth giving your hand away to get another bet or two in the pot. (See Chapter Eight, "The Value of Deception," and Chapter Fifteen, "Slowplaying.") Essentially, the decision to raise on an early round depends upon the size of the pot and how big a favorite you think your hand is.
Ironically, the better your hand, the more reason you would have for not raising on an early round If you think opponents will call another player's bet but fold if you raise, and if at the same time you figure they aren't getting sufficient pot odds to call a bet if they knew what you had, then you should not raise. You should give them the opportunity to make the mistake of calling. However, if they are getting correct pot odds to call a single bet, which is most often the case, you should raise even if they are still getting sufficient pot odds to call both the bet and the raise. In this instance, you're rooting for them to fold, but when they do call, you're at least getting more money in a pot you expect to win most of the time. Then again, by all means raise if you expect an opponent who shouldn't even call a single bet to call a raise. You might as well get as much money from a hopeless chaser as you possibly can. Similarly, when you get heads-up with one opponent in a limit game, it is generally correct to raise if you think you have the best hand to make your opponent fold hands with which he might outdraw you.
As the pot gets larger and larger, it becomes less and less important to disguise your big hands and more and more important to get even more money in the pot. Often with a large pot, you're rooting for opponents to fold when you raise, for they're probably getting sufficient pot odds to call. However, whether you hope they fold or hope they call, the size of the pot is likely to keep them around to see another card. Therefore, it is usually correct to raise with what you think is the best hand and get more money into a large pot even if it tends to give your hand away.
We reduce the principal reasons for raising to seven:
1. To get more money in the pot when you have the best hand.
2. To drive out opponents when you have the best hand.
3. To bluff or semi-bluff.
4. To get a free card.
5. To gain information.
6. To drive out worse hands when your own hand may be second best.
7. To drive out better hands when a come hand bets.
Now let's look at each of these reasons individually.
Raising to Get More Money in the Pot
Getting more money in the pot is the primary reason to raise when you think you have the best hand. Clearly you would raise a single opponent on the end with what you think is the best hand, but on earlier rounds you must always decide whether it's worth giving your hand away to get another bet or two in the pot. (See Chapter Eight, "The Value of Deception," and Chapter Fifteen, "Slowplaying.") Essentially, the decision to raise on an early round depends upon the size of the pot and how big a favorite you think your hand is.
Ironically, the better your hand, the more reason you would have for not raising on an early round If you think opponents will call another player's bet but fold if you raise, and if at the same time you figure they aren't getting sufficient pot odds to call a bet if they knew what you had, then you should not raise. You should give them the opportunity to make the mistake of calling. However, if they are getting correct pot odds to call a single bet, which is most often the case, you should raise even if they are still getting sufficient pot odds to call both the bet and the raise. In this instance, you're rooting for them to fold, but when they do call, you're at least getting more money in a pot you expect to win most of the time. Then again, by all means raise if you expect an opponent who shouldn't even call a single bet to call a raise. You might as well get as much money from a hopeless chaser as you possibly can. Similarly, when you get heads-up with one opponent in a limit game, it is generally correct to raise if you think you have the best hand to make your opponent fold hands with which he might outdraw you.
As the pot gets larger and larger, it becomes less and less important to disguise your big hands and more and more important to get even more money in the pot. Often with a large pot, you're rooting for opponents to fold when you raise, for they're probably getting sufficient pot odds to call. However, whether you hope they fold or hope they call, the size of the pot is likely to keep them around to see another card. Therefore, it is usually correct to raise with what you think is the best hand and get more money into a large pot even if it tends to give your hand away.
The Delayed Semi-Bluff Raise
A third case in which calling against a possible semi-bluff might be a good play is what I might call the delayed semi-bluff raise. It's a play I make against very tough players who frequently semi-bluff and who are thoroughly familiar with the ordinary semi-bluff raise as a response to their semi-bluffs.
Here's how it works. In seven-card stud I might have a queen showing and a queen in the hole, giving me a pair of queens, and an opponent with a king showing raises. I suspect this person might be semi-bluffing with maybe a small pair or even less, but I just call. On the next card we both catch blanks, and the opponent comes out firing. What I do now is raise! I raise with a pair of queens into a possible pair of kings. It may seem like a strange play, but it adds a confusing twist to the ordinary semi-bluff raise. When I called the first bet, my opponent suspected I bad queens though [ could have bad something like a three-flush. Now when I raise him on fourth street, my opponent has to wonder whether I've made queens up. Unless he really does have two kings, he can't conceivably call with something like ace, king high. And I want him to fold even if my pair of queens is the best hand. I want him to make a mistake according to the Fundamental Theorem of Poker, because with a couple of overcards or with, say, a small pair and one overcard, he is getting sufficient odds for a call.
Suppose, though, my opponent really does have kings. Well, I'm not in the best of shape, but my opponent most likely won't reraise, fearing I have queens up. Furthermore, he'll check to me on the next round if his hand hasn't improved, and I can get myself a free card. Should this card happen to give me an open pair, it would be very difficult even for a pair of kings to call my bet since it looks as if there's a good chance I've now made a full house.
Summary
While calling may be a good defense against the semi-bluff in situations similar to the three described, remember that normally the correct play is to fold with marginal hands, and if folding isn't correct, then you should raise. We'll conclude this chapter with an example of each response to the possible semi-bluff:
Seven-Card Stud
(Small Pot)
Your opponent bets. How should you play?
You should fold without hesitation. Even though your opponent may be betting a four-flush or a straight draw, you have too many ways to lose. Your opponent might not even gel the flush or straight but make a pair of 10s or kings to beat you:
Seven-Card Stud
(Medium-Sized Pot)
Your opponent bets when he pairs the 5s. How should you play? Your should raise. If your opponent has only one pair, you want to make it expensive for him to draw another card, perhaps even forcing him to fold. If he does have two pair smaller than your kings, you're not that much of an underdog. He may even fold two small pair. If he does call with them, he figures to check to you on the next round, giving you a chance to take a free card. The only hands he might have that are real trouble for you are aces up and three 5s, but there is no reason to think he has them:
You bet, and your opponent raises. How should you play?
The question you are facing here is whether your opponent has a flush draw, an open-ended straight draw, or something like 10,9 - or whether he has a better hand than yours, something like an A, 10, a K, 10, two pair, or three-of-a-kind. Since the combined chances of your being beat already or being outdrawn make your opponent the favorite at this point, you should call rather than raise. But on the next card you should come right out betting, unless a heart, 6, 9, or jack falls. If your opponent raises again, you should usually fold; most players won't bluff or semi-bluff a second time in this spot.
When someone bets or raises but may be semi-bluffing, your decision is one of the trickiest in poker. You must choose whether to fold; raise; reraise; call and bet on the next round; call and check-raise on the next round; call and then check and call on the next round; or call and fold on the next round if the card your opponent catches would make the hand with which he might have been semi-bluffing. Making the correct decision consistently separates the true champion from the merely good player.
Here's how it works. In seven-card stud I might have a queen showing and a queen in the hole, giving me a pair of queens, and an opponent with a king showing raises. I suspect this person might be semi-bluffing with maybe a small pair or even less, but I just call. On the next card we both catch blanks, and the opponent comes out firing. What I do now is raise! I raise with a pair of queens into a possible pair of kings. It may seem like a strange play, but it adds a confusing twist to the ordinary semi-bluff raise. When I called the first bet, my opponent suspected I bad queens though [ could have bad something like a three-flush. Now when I raise him on fourth street, my opponent has to wonder whether I've made queens up. Unless he really does have two kings, he can't conceivably call with something like ace, king high. And I want him to fold even if my pair of queens is the best hand. I want him to make a mistake according to the Fundamental Theorem of Poker, because with a couple of overcards or with, say, a small pair and one overcard, he is getting sufficient odds for a call.
Suppose, though, my opponent really does have kings. Well, I'm not in the best of shape, but my opponent most likely won't reraise, fearing I have queens up. Furthermore, he'll check to me on the next round if his hand hasn't improved, and I can get myself a free card. Should this card happen to give me an open pair, it would be very difficult even for a pair of kings to call my bet since it looks as if there's a good chance I've now made a full house.
Summary
While calling may be a good defense against the semi-bluff in situations similar to the three described, remember that normally the correct play is to fold with marginal hands, and if folding isn't correct, then you should raise. We'll conclude this chapter with an example of each response to the possible semi-bluff:
Seven-Card Stud
(Small Pot)
Your opponent bets. How should you play?
You should fold without hesitation. Even though your opponent may be betting a four-flush or a straight draw, you have too many ways to lose. Your opponent might not even gel the flush or straight but make a pair of 10s or kings to beat you:
Seven-Card Stud
(Medium-Sized Pot)
Your opponent bets when he pairs the 5s. How should you play? Your should raise. If your opponent has only one pair, you want to make it expensive for him to draw another card, perhaps even forcing him to fold. If he does have two pair smaller than your kings, you're not that much of an underdog. He may even fold two small pair. If he does call with them, he figures to check to you on the next round, giving you a chance to take a free card. The only hands he might have that are real trouble for you are aces up and three 5s, but there is no reason to think he has them:
You bet, and your opponent raises. How should you play?
The question you are facing here is whether your opponent has a flush draw, an open-ended straight draw, or something like 10,9 - or whether he has a better hand than yours, something like an A, 10, a K, 10, two pair, or three-of-a-kind. Since the combined chances of your being beat already or being outdrawn make your opponent the favorite at this point, you should call rather than raise. But on the next card you should come right out betting, unless a heart, 6, 9, or jack falls. If your opponent raises again, you should usually fold; most players won't bluff or semi-bluff a second time in this spot.
When someone bets or raises but may be semi-bluffing, your decision is one of the trickiest in poker. You must choose whether to fold; raise; reraise; call and bet on the next round; call and check-raise on the next round; call and then check and call on the next round; or call and fold on the next round if the card your opponent catches would make the hand with which he might have been semi-bluffing. Making the correct decision consistently separates the true champion from the merely good player.
Calling a Possible Bet On the Come
Secondly, in stud and hold 'em games, it is usually a mistake to raise with a good but not a great hand when you think your opponent - particularly a very tough opponent - has bet or raised on the come for a flush or a straight. If his bet was legitimate, he probably has you beat, so you're simply donating money to the pot. If he was on the come, he has an easy call of your raise, which eliminates most of the reasons for you to make it. Thus, even if you were quite sure that the Q♠J♠9♠ earlier in this chapter had only a four-flush, you would not be correct in raising. You would only call.
However, when you call an opponent who you think is on the come, you usually do so with the intention of betting right out on the next round any time that opponent draws a blank card that would not make his hand if he was in fact on the come. You now become the favorite if your opponent was on the come, and you don't want to give him a free card.
There is a mathematical reason for you to play your hand this way. Let's say you bet with two cards to come, and someone raises you. You estimate that there is a one-third chance that player has you beat and a two-thirds chance he is on a draw. Nevertheless in most cases he is still a mathematical favorite. So you can only call the raise since you're the underdog. However, when the next card cannot have made his flush or straight if he was drawing to it, now, with only one card to come, you have reverted to being the favorite. So you should usually bet. On the other hand, if that card makes the possible flush or straight, you should usually check and fold if your opponent bets, unless you are getting good enough pot odds to chase. Your opponent almost certainly has you beat, whether he was originally betting a legitimate hand or betting on the come.
Here is an example of this calling defense against a possible semi-bluff that came up when I was playing recently in a seven-stud game. I started with a three-flush and a 10 showing and was lucky enough to make three 8s on fifth street. I bet, and a good player who caught a K♥ with the J♥ as his door card raised. I reasoned the raise meant one of three things. Either my opponent had started with kings in the hole, in which case he was raising with the best hand; or he had started with two jacks, made kings up, and raised, figuring I was betting 10s and 8s; or he had a flush or a straight draw. I called the raise. When no heart, ace, or 9 fell on sixth street, which might make a straight or flush, I bet right out, much to my opponent's surprise, for my opponent had been expecting to get a free card. It turned out the opponent was in fact on a flush draw with a small pair, and the three 8s held up. (Of course, if a heart, ace, or 9 had fallen, the play in this instance would have been to check and call since there was a reasonable chance for me to make a full house on the last card.)
However, when you call an opponent who you think is on the come, you usually do so with the intention of betting right out on the next round any time that opponent draws a blank card that would not make his hand if he was in fact on the come. You now become the favorite if your opponent was on the come, and you don't want to give him a free card.
There is a mathematical reason for you to play your hand this way. Let's say you bet with two cards to come, and someone raises you. You estimate that there is a one-third chance that player has you beat and a two-thirds chance he is on a draw. Nevertheless in most cases he is still a mathematical favorite. So you can only call the raise since you're the underdog. However, when the next card cannot have made his flush or straight if he was drawing to it, now, with only one card to come, you have reverted to being the favorite. So you should usually bet. On the other hand, if that card makes the possible flush or straight, you should usually check and fold if your opponent bets, unless you are getting good enough pot odds to chase. Your opponent almost certainly has you beat, whether he was originally betting a legitimate hand or betting on the come.
Here is an example of this calling defense against a possible semi-bluff that came up when I was playing recently in a seven-stud game. I started with a three-flush and a 10 showing and was lucky enough to make three 8s on fifth street. I bet, and a good player who caught a K♥ with the J♥ as his door card raised. I reasoned the raise meant one of three things. Either my opponent had started with kings in the hole, in which case he was raising with the best hand; or he had started with two jacks, made kings up, and raised, figuring I was betting 10s and 8s; or he had a flush or a straight draw. I called the raise. When no heart, ace, or 9 fell on sixth street, which might make a straight or flush, I bet right out, much to my opponent's surprise, for my opponent had been expecting to get a free card. It turned out the opponent was in fact on a flush draw with a small pair, and the three 8s held up. (Of course, if a heart, ace, or 9 had fallen, the play in this instance would have been to check and call since there was a reasonable chance for me to make a full house on the last card.)
Calling a Possible Semi-Bluff When the Pot is Large
First, you would call when the pot is large, even if there's a chance your opponent is semi-bluffing. Possessing any kind of competitive hand yourself, you certainly don't want to give away a big pot to a possible semi-bluff. So you can't fold. At the same time, there is no point in risking a raise since, because of the size of the pot, your opponent will call even if he is semi-bluffing. And if he's not semi-bluffing but has the best hand, he may reraise you. Therefore, the only play is to call.
Exceptions When Calling is Correct
We have said that either folding or raising is the correct play against a possible semi-bluff most of the time. There are three situations in which just calling would be correct.
When to Fold and When to Raise
We have said, up to this point, that the two main defenses against the semi-bluff are simply giving up and folding, or raising. (In all cases we are assuming the pot is relatively small.) The question now is when to do the one and when to do the other. That is, when do you fold, and when do you raise?
Obviously when you have a very poor hand, you fold. When you have a big hand, you raise unless it's so big you want to slowplay and trap your opponent later. The difficult decisions occur when you have a medium-value hand. There are three principle criteria you should use in deciding whether to raise or fold:
1. The chances your opponent is bluffing or semi-bluffing.
2. The chances that opponent will outdraw you if he is betting with the worst hand.
3. The chances you will outdraw that opponent if he is betting the best hand.
The more you believe your opponent is bluffing or semi-bluffing, and the greater your chances of outdrawing him if he does have a legitimate hand, the more you will tend to raise. On the other hand, the smaller these chances are and the greater the chances your opponent will outdraw you if he is betting the worst hand, the more you would tend to fold. Recall an example earlier in this chapter. The chances that your opponent had the best hand were quite high (48 percent); the chances of your outdrawing him were so low as to be virtually nonexistent. At the same time the chances of your opponent outdrawing you were very high (you were only a 6-to-5 favorite if he didn't already have you beat). It was the combination of all these chances that dictated a fold.
Obviously when you have a very poor hand, you fold. When you have a big hand, you raise unless it's so big you want to slowplay and trap your opponent later. The difficult decisions occur when you have a medium-value hand. There are three principle criteria you should use in deciding whether to raise or fold:
1. The chances your opponent is bluffing or semi-bluffing.
2. The chances that opponent will outdraw you if he is betting with the worst hand.
3. The chances you will outdraw that opponent if he is betting the best hand.
The more you believe your opponent is bluffing or semi-bluffing, and the greater your chances of outdrawing him if he does have a legitimate hand, the more you will tend to raise. On the other hand, the smaller these chances are and the greater the chances your opponent will outdraw you if he is betting the worst hand, the more you would tend to fold. Recall an example earlier in this chapter. The chances that your opponent had the best hand were quite high (48 percent); the chances of your outdrawing him were so low as to be virtually nonexistent. At the same time the chances of your opponent outdrawing you were very high (you were only a 6-to-5 favorite if he didn't already have you beat). It was the combination of all these chances that dictated a fold.
The Semi-Bluff Raise as a Defense Against the Semi-Bluff
While the confrontation just described shows the difficulty of defending against the semi-bluff, it also demonstrates one of the best defensive counter-strategies against it - the semi-bluff raise. Notice that when you bet into a Q♠J♠ with a pair of 9s in the hole and K,5 showing, you were semi-bluffing yourself. You were trying to represent kings in the hope that your opponent would fold with a pair of queens, a pair of jacks, or a worse hand. It turns out your opponent did have a worse hand - a pair of 7s and a three-flush. But what did he do instead of folding? He raised. He made a semi-bluff raise into a possible pair of kings with a three-flush and a small pair. Of course, if you had really had two kings, he'd be in trouble. But since you were semi-bluffing yourself, as your opponent suspected, his semi-bluff raise turned the tables on you. It put you on the defensive and him in the driver's seat.
To elucidate the effect of this type of play further, we'll talk about stealing the antes. Stealing antes is one form of the semi-bluff. A player raises immediately, representing a strong hand, and makes it too expensive, given the size of the pot, for a mediocre hand to continue. A simple example would be from seven-card razz, where the high card typically has to make a small bet to start the action and a low card usually raises.
Let's say I have a low card showing, with a second low card and a king in the hole. One player behind me also has a low card showing. With a two-card low, I do not have a legitimate hand, but nevertheless, I'm in a profitable semi-bluffing situation because I suspect that if I raise, one of two things can happen. The low card might fold behind me, in which case I win the antes immediately since the high cards will also fold. Or the low card might call, in which case I'm in trouble.
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However, all is not lost because my bet was not a pure bluff but a semi-bluff. I have an extra chance to win if I catch a little card on the next round and my opponent catches a big card.
When I bet at that point, my opponent is likely to fold. If he calls, well, we both presumably have three-card lows, so I can't be too much of an underdog. I may still make the best low hand and win in the showdown.
When you semi-bluff, then, you are looking to win in one of three ways - by making your opponents fold, by catching a scare card on the next round to make them fold, or by drawing out on them and producing the best hand in the showdown. This combination of possibilities makes you the favorite when you raise.
But what happens when, instead of calling my raise, that low card behind me reraises? Suddenly my semi-bluff has been shattered.
When you reraise a possible semi-bluff in such situations, your opponent is pretty much forced to fold when you've caught him without a legitimate hand. For instance, in seven-card stud a player with
may raise against a jack showing in an attempt to steal the antes. Even if the jack calls, the semi-bluffer may catch an ace or a king on the next card, giving him the best hand against two jacks, or he may catch a scare card like a queen suited with the king. Therefore, you should usually reraise with a decent hand like two jacks. If the king is semi-bluffing and doesn't have two jacks beat, you are applying pressure on him to fold or call with the worst hand. Of course, we can take this situation a step further. The original semi-bluffer could make a semi-bluff reraise if he thinks there's a reasonable chance the obvious pair of jacks will give up and fold.
Observe, though, that in none of these instances is a simple call any kind of a defense when you suspect you're up against a possible semi-bluff. You should not say to yourself, "This may be a semi-bluff, and I may have the best hand. Therefore, I'll call." When you call, you are faced with the problem that your opponent may subsequently make the best hand if he doesn't have it already or he may look like he's made it. However, when you raise, you probably take away these latter two possibilities. An opponent will call - or perhaps reraise - with a legitimate hand, but he will very possibly fold if he was semi-bluffing. Even if he does call, it is with the worse hand. Another advantage to your raise is that it will deter your opponent from semi-bluffing against you in the future, and still another is that you are getting more money in the pot when an opponent calls with a worse hand.
To repeat, when you suspect an opponent may be semi-bluffing, you still have to fold most of your hands - like that pair of 9s earlier in the chapter. However, when you have a hand that is worth a call, in most cases you should raise. This is just one of many situations in poker where, when folding is not the best play, raising is, and calling is the worst of the three alternatives.
There is a situation that frequently comes up in hold 'em which calls for a semi-bluff raise.
You're in last position, and you pick up something like
a pretty fair starting hand. Suddenly the man to your right raises, and you suspect he's using his late position to try to steal the antes. Since your hand is too good to fold, you must reraise. You must not let the first raiser have that extra double chance of winning on a semi-bluff. Similarly, as we saw earlier, if you 're the last low card in razz and the next-to-last low card raises, very possibly as a semi-bluff, you cannot simply call with a decent hand and give your opponent two extra ways of winning. Even with a hand as marginal as
you must reraise to make that player fold or pay with his poor hands.
You gain another advantage when you make this kind of response. You do not want to have an opponent who is semi-bluffing with the correct frequency. By picking off his semi-bluffs, you reduce the times he'll try it on those occasions when he ought to. Your reraise has forced him to think twice about semi-bluffing in the future. (See Chapters Eighteen and Nineteen.)
To elucidate the effect of this type of play further, we'll talk about stealing the antes. Stealing antes is one form of the semi-bluff. A player raises immediately, representing a strong hand, and makes it too expensive, given the size of the pot, for a mediocre hand to continue. A simple example would be from seven-card razz, where the high card typically has to make a small bet to start the action and a low card usually raises.
Let's say I have a low card showing, with a second low card and a king in the hole. One player behind me also has a low card showing. With a two-card low, I do not have a legitimate hand, but nevertheless, I'm in a profitable semi-bluffing situation because I suspect that if I raise, one of two things can happen. The low card might fold behind me, in which case I win the antes immediately since the high cards will also fold. Or the low card might call, in which case I'm in trouble.
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However, all is not lost because my bet was not a pure bluff but a semi-bluff. I have an extra chance to win if I catch a little card on the next round and my opponent catches a big card.
When I bet at that point, my opponent is likely to fold. If he calls, well, we both presumably have three-card lows, so I can't be too much of an underdog. I may still make the best low hand and win in the showdown.
When you semi-bluff, then, you are looking to win in one of three ways - by making your opponents fold, by catching a scare card on the next round to make them fold, or by drawing out on them and producing the best hand in the showdown. This combination of possibilities makes you the favorite when you raise.
But what happens when, instead of calling my raise, that low card behind me reraises? Suddenly my semi-bluff has been shattered.
When you reraise a possible semi-bluff in such situations, your opponent is pretty much forced to fold when you've caught him without a legitimate hand. For instance, in seven-card stud a player with
may raise against a jack showing in an attempt to steal the antes. Even if the jack calls, the semi-bluffer may catch an ace or a king on the next card, giving him the best hand against two jacks, or he may catch a scare card like a queen suited with the king. Therefore, you should usually reraise with a decent hand like two jacks. If the king is semi-bluffing and doesn't have two jacks beat, you are applying pressure on him to fold or call with the worst hand. Of course, we can take this situation a step further. The original semi-bluffer could make a semi-bluff reraise if he thinks there's a reasonable chance the obvious pair of jacks will give up and fold.
Observe, though, that in none of these instances is a simple call any kind of a defense when you suspect you're up against a possible semi-bluff. You should not say to yourself, "This may be a semi-bluff, and I may have the best hand. Therefore, I'll call." When you call, you are faced with the problem that your opponent may subsequently make the best hand if he doesn't have it already or he may look like he's made it. However, when you raise, you probably take away these latter two possibilities. An opponent will call - or perhaps reraise - with a legitimate hand, but he will very possibly fold if he was semi-bluffing. Even if he does call, it is with the worse hand. Another advantage to your raise is that it will deter your opponent from semi-bluffing against you in the future, and still another is that you are getting more money in the pot when an opponent calls with a worse hand.
To repeat, when you suspect an opponent may be semi-bluffing, you still have to fold most of your hands - like that pair of 9s earlier in the chapter. However, when you have a hand that is worth a call, in most cases you should raise. This is just one of many situations in poker where, when folding is not the best play, raising is, and calling is the worst of the three alternatives.
There is a situation that frequently comes up in hold 'em which calls for a semi-bluff raise.
You're in last position, and you pick up something like
a pretty fair starting hand. Suddenly the man to your right raises, and you suspect he's using his late position to try to steal the antes. Since your hand is too good to fold, you must reraise. You must not let the first raiser have that extra double chance of winning on a semi-bluff. Similarly, as we saw earlier, if you 're the last low card in razz and the next-to-last low card raises, very possibly as a semi-bluff, you cannot simply call with a decent hand and give your opponent two extra ways of winning. Even with a hand as marginal as
you must reraise to make that player fold or pay with his poor hands.
You gain another advantage when you make this kind of response. You do not want to have an opponent who is semi-bluffing with the correct frequency. By picking off his semi-bluffs, you reduce the times he'll try it on those occasions when he ought to. Your reraise has forced him to think twice about semi-bluffing in the future. (See Chapters Eighteen and Nineteen.)
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